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Executive summary 
 
When the global financial crisis broke out in earnest in September 2008, it quickly became clear that 
developing countries would also be affected, but that the impacts would vary markedly. The Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) coordinated a multi-country study over January-March 2009 involving 
developing country teams in 10 countries. This showed that, while the transmission mechanisms were 
similar in each (trade, private capital flows, remittances, aid), the effects varied by country, and much 
was not yet visible. As such, further country-specific monitoring was required. Most findings suggested 
that, as a result of time lags, the worst effects were yet to come. This synthesis of the effects of the 
global financial crisis on developing countries updates the description of the economic and social 
situation during the course of the crisis in 11 countries. 
 
The synthesis includes a series of easy-to-read comparative tables of how the 11 countries have been 
affected. Below we summarise some key facts. 
 
Portfolio flows were hit particularly hard by the crisis in late 2008 and early 2009 which points to 
the fact there was (global) financial contagion effect: a flight to safety everywhere. In Bangladesh, 
$159 million worth of portfolio investment was withdrawn in FY 2008/09. The Nairobi Stock Exchange 
(NSE) 20 Share Index had declined by 46% by February 2009 compared to the previous year. In Sudan, 
portfolio investment fell from $30.5 million in 2007 to -$33.4 million in 2008. In Zambia, portfolio 
investment in equities and government securities have been adversely affected by the global crisis and 
the resulting fall in copper prices over 2008. Net flows truned negative in 2008 and remained to until at 
least September 2009.  
 
However, there have been some signs of a recovery since the second quarter of 2009. In 
Bangladesh, portfolio investment outflows reduced to $25 million in July-August of FY2009/10. In 
Kenya, the NSE 20 Share Index recovered by 17.5% between March and June 2009, even though it 
slumped again by 8.8% in the period July-September 2009 In Zambia, the net position in portfolio 
investment slowly improved from April-July 2009, but reversed again in August. The All Share Index rose 
from 2143.4 points at the end of the first quarter of 2009 to 2615.8 points at the end of August 2009. 
Stock market capitalisation increased by 22% from April-August 2009. In Tanzania, total stock market 
turnover increased by 228% between Q2 and Q3 of 2009. 
 
FDI long regarded as resilient to the crisis fell dramatically in several countries. In Cambodia, net 
FDI inflows fell by 50% in 2009, hitting in particular the garment and tourism sectors. In Bolivia, FDI 
flows reduced sharply in the fourth quarter of 2008 and this pattern continued in the first two quarters 
of 2009. In DRC, FDI decreased sharply from $1713 million in 2008 to $374 million in 2009. Uganda 
experienced a drop in FDI by 6.2% in 2007/08-2008/09. In Ethiopia, FDI flows declined by 31% from Q2 
of 2008 to Q1 of 2009. The Tanzania Investment Centre recorded a drop of about 30% in the value of 
new investments during the first half of 2009 compared with the same period in 2008.  
 
Banking stresses did become visible in low income countries. In Tanzania, the average capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) stood well above its benchmark. In Kenya, the CAR stood well above the minimum 
required. However, the NPLs/assets ratio, which had declined significantly in 2008, increased from 
3.4% in August 2008 to 3.7% in August 2009. The non-performing loans (NPLs) to total assets ratio 
almost doubled in Zambia, from 7% in the first quarter of 2009 to 13% in the third quarter of 2009. 
 
Remittances grew substantially up to 2008 in all case studies (for which there were data), but the 
crisis led to a decline or greatly reduced growth in remittances during the second half of 2008 
(Bolivia, Kenya, Uganda) and/or at the beginning of 2009 (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ethiopia). 
Remittances in Bolivia were down by 8% in first three quarters of 2009 compared to the same period 
last year. Bangladesh was the only country for which remittances have continued to grow throughout 
the period (22% in FY 2008/9 compared to a year ago), although at a lower rate than in the pre-crisis 
period. 
  vii
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Trade declines were visible in a wide range of sectors. Garment export values in Cambodia were 
down by 19% for the first nine months of 2009 compared with the same period in 2008; volumes over 
the same period declined by about 16%. In the case of Ethiopia, declines in wholesale market prices for 
cut flowers in the Netherlands meant that the country earned only 47% of a projected $280 million from 
flower exports in FY2008/09, which resulted in the inability of some producers to service debts to the 
Development Bank of Ethiopia. Between January and August 2009, Kenyan horticultural exports 
declined by 35% in volume terms compared with the same period in 2008. There was a reported 10% 
decline in the number of tourists arriving in mainland Tanzania in January to April 2009 compared with 
January to April 2008. Consequently, the revenue obtained from arrivals declined to $302.1 million in 
the period January to April 2009 compared with $388.2 million for the same period in 2008. Oil 
accounts for more than 95% of Sudan’s total exports. As a result of reduced oil prices on world 
markets, it was projected the total value of Sudan’s exports would decline from $12.9 billion in 2008 to 
$5.3 billion in 2009. In Mozambique, the value of exports of goods between January and September 
2009 fell by 37% compared with the same period in 2008 
Reserves in some countries had become dangerously low. By end of February 2009, gross official 
reserves in DRC had plunged to a level of $33 million, the equivalent of less than 1 day of imports. IMF 
support (ESF) helped to raise the reserves to nearly 2 weeks of imports. 
 
The growth effects are highly varied. Cambodia saw a double digit growth rate reduce to zero in 
2009. Kenya has had a low growth rate of 2% last year, compared to 7% in 2007, although other crises 
play a role as well. Uganda, Zambia and Tanzania saw their growth rate reduce by much less. 
 
Employment effects due to the crisis were mostly apparent in garment and mining sectors. At 
least 25,000-30,000 garments workers lost their jobs in the last eight months of 2009 in Bangladesh. 
Cambodia lost 102,527 jobs (either permanently or temporarily) over the period since September 2009, 
or one-third of the garment employment. Zambia lost 10,o00 out of 30,000 jobs although some lost 
ground has been made up. Three quarters of artisanal miners in DRC, or some 18,000, lost their jobs 
(dominated mainly by Chinese small scale enterprises). 44 out of 75 mining companies in Katanga had 
closed by March 2009 after the fall in mineral prices.  
 
However, overall, with a few exceptions effects were manageable on a macro scale. For example, 
despite a weakening current account, and severe effects in Zambian mining, the economy grew at 6.2% 
per annum. There is also positive news from the crisis. Remittances to Bangladesh increased markedly 
throughout the crisis. Tanzania’s gold exports saw prices increase while prices of oil imports fell. Aid 
has continued to increase in most countries 
 
Emerging markets helped low income countries during the crisis. China is an important or the most 
important donor in Cambodia and Sudan, and is becoming important in Kenya, and it played a key role 
during the crisis in these countries. At the China–Africa summit in November 2009, China’s Premier 
pledged $10 billion in new low-cost loans to Africa over the next three years, double the commitment 
made in the 2006 summit. China is a key export destination for Sudan, Zambia and DRC, although it is 
a competitor in third markets for garments from Bangladesh and Cambodia. China is a key (private) 
investor in Cambodia, DRC, Sudan and Zambia. The economic position of other emerging countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China) is also important for low-income countries. Brazil imports gas from Bolivia, 
South Africa is responsible for remittances to and exports from Mozambique and Russia is an emerging 
destination for Cambodian garments, Tanzanian tea and Ethiopian flowers. India has links in most 
countries: Sudan (financing deficit); Tanzania and Mozambique (cashew nuts imports) and Zambia 
(FDI).  
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In the rest of this executive summary, we focus on the key implications of the research: 
 
• The effects are larger and smaller than expected depending on the underlying perspective one 
takes. Compared with original suggestions that developing countries would somehow be 
shielded from the financial crisis, the effects are likely to be very large, with some 50-100 
million new poor people. But the effects on average are manageable (e.g., on the basis of 
recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) data and forecasts, sub-Saharan African gross 
domestic product (GDP) will have lost 7% by the end of 2010 compared with forecasts pre-
crisis, or some US$84 billion), with some outliers (Cambodia and certain oil and mineral 
exporters, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which needed external support). 
For individual countries, this is not very large compared with previous domestic shocks, 
although the global nature and scale of this shock have been unprecedented since the Great 
Depression in the 1930s. 
• While all countries are being affected by the financial crisis, it should immediately be added 
that the impact is highly varied, from very small or no macro effects in some countries (even 
though disaggregated effects at sector level and in some groups may be visible) to very large 
effects in others.  
• Financial transmission mechanisms to low-income countries initially appeared limited, and 
attention quickly focused on the real (trade and remittance) transmission mechanisms; 
however, it is now clear that bank lending, stock market contagion and worsening banking 
systems did propagate the crisis. One lesson is that some low-income countries are more 
integrated financially than is often thought.  
• Another myth expelled by the crisis is that foreign direct investment (FDI) is always resilient in 
crises (or more resilient than other flows). In fact, FDI fell significantly in countries such as the 
DRC (even before security problems occurred), Cambodia and Bolivia. In some other countries, 
such as Uganda and Kenya, portfolio flows changed quickly. 
• While certain types of openness have left countries more exposed to crisis, this may not always 
have meant increased vulnerability, as some countries have also become more resilient (e.g. 
Tanzania and Bolivia through good macroeconomic management, including using mineral 
resources to build up reserves). It is important that countries promote crisis-resilient growth, 
as in this way they are better prepared for recovery.  
• In particular, diversification (products and destinations) is important for growth and 
resilience to crises. This should be promoted and could draw more attention than has 
previously  been the case – of course in a market-friendly way, so that new policy interventions 
are  not completely delinked from private sector needs. It may also be important to diversify 
sources of capital flows, such as FDI inflows. For example, Chinese FDI is now making up for 
some of the losses in mining in Zambia. 
• Good macroeconomic management allows more scope for policy responses later. This 
requires good institutions in managing finances.  
• Indeed, the crisis highlights that flexible institutions are important in dealing with crises. 
There are examples of task forces that led to policy responses to the crisis in Bangladesh, 
Tanzania and Mauritius, and these were set in a more institutionalised way. 
• This global financial crisis has increased the importance of links between emerging markets 
and low-income countries. 
• Policy responses in many country case studies were well designed (even though in the 
previous phase we asked why there had been no responses): they used fiscal, financial and 
monetary policies to address short-run economic management (fiscal policies constrained by 
resources; monetary policies lagged owing to previous inflationary pressures), and they did not 
engage in major policy reversals. In fact, so-called ‘doing business’ reforms continued.  
• Protectionism did not affect the case study countries much, and trade finance was not 
mentioned as a binding constraint to trade.  
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1. Introduction  
 
When the global financial crisis broke out in earnest in September 2008, it quickly became clear that 
developing countries would also be affected, but that the impacts would vary markedly. The Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) coordinated a multi-country study over January-March 2009 involving 
developing country teams in 10 countries. This showed that, while the transmission mechanisms were 
similar in each (trade, private capital flows, remittances, aid), the effects varied by country, and much 
was not yet visible. As such, further country-specific monitoring was required. Most findings suggested 
that, as a result of time lags, the worst effects were yet to come. This paper provides an update on the 
effects of the global financial crisis on developing countries by updating the description of the 
economic and social situation during the course of the crisis in 11 countries.  
 
Phase 2 of the country case studies, which ran from July-December 2009, aimed to: 
 
• Update information on the effects of the global financial crisis, based on the methodology 
developed in Phase 1, by examining the following transmission belts: private financial flows 
(splitting out portfolio flows, foreign direct investment (FDI) and international bank lending); 
trade (imports and exports); remittances; and aid. 
• Update information on economic (growth) and social (employment and poverty) effects.  
• Continue to monitor policy responses. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the main building blocks of the methodology used: 
 
• The global shock; 
• Transmission mechanisms at country level; 
• Effects on growth, investment, sectors, poverty and inequality at country level; 
• Domestic policy responses. 
 
This synthesis is accompanied by a methodology paper. 
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Figure 1: Mapping out the effects of the global crisis and policy responses 
 
What is the shock at global level? 
 
 
 
 
 The following characteristics determine how the global shock creates country effects: 
• Level and type of economic and financial integration  
• Characteristics and distribution of links with other countries 
• Structure of economy 
• Policy  
  
What are the transmission mechanisms? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following national characteristics determine the macro effects of the transmission mechanisms: 
• Economic/social structures 
• Institutions/policies  
• Assets, prices, employment 
• Access to goods and services 
 
What are the broad macro effects? (effects so far, possible effects) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Review of policy responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Is the country well placed to benefit from a recovery, and can it respond more effectively to future crisis? 
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2. The effects of the global financial crisis: key transmission 
mechanisms  
 
The country case studies describe what happened to key transmission mechanisms during the global 
financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. Often, this is a before/after comparison. Sometimes, a deeper 
analysis has been provided, but we should acknowledge the difficulties in estimating the effects of the 
global financial crisis with so few data, when many of the case study countries have also been hit by 
other crises, such as high food and fuel prices or political crises and conflict. 
 
The sections below discuss the transmission mechanisms. 
 
2.1 Private capital flows 
 
The country case studies distinguish among three different categories of capital flows: portfolio 
investment,2
 
 FDI and international bank lending. The evidence on these three components suggests 
that: 
1. Portfolio investment flows experienced dramatic drops and sometimes shifted to large net 
outflows in 2008 and early 2009, but in a few countries (Bangladesh, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania) 
they seem to have started to rebound slowly since the second quarter of 2009. 
2. FDI, which was expected to be more resilient than other private capital flows to the adverse 
shocks of the crisis, experienced sharp declines in Cambodia, Bolivia, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC), Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan from mid-2008 and over 2009. 
3. There is little evidence of a drop in international bank lending up to 2009 in the country case 
studies.  
 
Table 1 summarises the types of private capital flows through which the crisis affected the selected 
countries under study in 2008 and 2009. 
 
Table 1: Private capital inflows in 2008 and 2009 affected during the global financial crisis in 
case studies 
 FDI Portfolio investment International bank lending 
  2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 
Bangladesh No Yes Yes Yes* No   
Bolivia Yes Yes Yes Yes No   
Cambodia Yes Yes N/A N/A No   
DRC No Yes Yes       
Ethiopia Yes Yes N/A N/A     
Kenya No No Yes Yes* No No  
Mozambique No No         
Sudan No Yes Yes   No No  
Tanzania No No No Yes* No No 
Uganda No Yes Yes   No   
Zambia No No Yes Yes* No   
Notes: ‘Yes’ if given private capital flows were transmission mechanisms of the crisis in a given country; ‘No’ 
otherwise. *Denotes signs of recovery since 2009Q2. Empty cells mean information has not been provided. 
Source: Based on country case studies.  
 
2.1.1 Portfolio investment  
Portfolio flows were hit particularly hard by the crisis over 2008 and early 2009. 
 
                                                            
2 Portfolio investment includes portfolio equity flows and bonds flows. 
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• In Bangladesh, $159 million worth of portfolio investment was withdrawn in FY 2008/09.3
• In Bolivia, portfolio investment dropped sharply in Q4 of 2008 and continued to decline in the 
first two quarters of 2009. 
 
• In Kenya, net portfolio equity flows declined significantly in June 2008, when they experienced 
an outflow worth $48 million. This fall coincided with the collapse of the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange (NSE) 20 Share Index which, by the end of February 2009, had declined by 46% in 
comparison with the previous year. The declining trend of the price-to-earnings ratio, from 19.8 
at the beginning of 2008 to an average value of 9.3 in March 2009, further points to a 
significant decline in investor confidence in the Kenya equity market. In 2009, several initial 
public offerings (IPOs) were postponed. On the other hand, bond flows appear to have been 
more resilient to the crisis, thanks to the support provided by local investors and the reduced 
withholding tax charged on interest income earned from long-term bonds, agreed in the 
government 2009/10 budget. In 2009, several bond issues were oversubscribed. For example, 
a 12-year KSh18.5 billion bond issued by the government to finance projects in energy, roads, 
water and sewerage was oversubscribed by 45%. 
• In DRC, share prices of mining companies collapsed in the latter part of 2008. 
• In Sudan, portfolio investment fell from $30.5 million in 2007 to -$33.4 million in 2008. Mainly 
portfolio equity flows to Sudan were hit, while share prices of the few companies and banks 
registered in both Sudanese and Gulf State stock markets collapsed. Sudanese stock market 
capitalisation (in local currency) contracted by about 16% between 2007 and 2008.  
• In Zambia, portfolio investment in equities and government securities have been adversely 
affected by the global crisis and the resulting fall in copper prices over 2008. Net flows were 
still negative for most months of data available in 2009 (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Zambia net foreign portfolio inflows, 2008-2009 (US$ millions) 
Source: Zambia case study. 
 
However, since the second quarter of 2009, in some countries the first signs have appeared of a slow 
rebound in portfolio flows, consistent with the improvement in financial conditions in developed 
countries and emerging markets and the consequent reduced uncertainty and increased confidence. 
 
• In Bangladesh, portfolio investment outflows reduced to $25 million in July-August of 
FY2009/10. 
• In Kenya, the NSE 20 Share Index recovered by 17.5% between March and June 2009, even 
though it slumped again by 8.8% in the period July-September 2009 (see Figure 3). 
 
  
                                                            
3 The fiscal year in Bangladesh runs from 1 July to 30 June. A withdrawal of $159 million is more than the total amount of 
portfolio inflows ($154 million) to Bangladesh during FY2006/07 and FY2007/08. 
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Figure 3: Nairobi Stock Exchange 20 Share Index, Mar-Sep 2009 
 
Source: Kenya case study. 
 
• In Zambia, the net position in portfolio investment slowly improved from April-July 2009, but 
reversed again in August (see Figure 2 above). The All Share Index rose from 2143.4 points at 
the end of the first quarter of 2009 to 2615.8 points at the end of August 2009, and is expected 
to continue to increase, mainly thanks to the recent upsurge in copper prices (see Figure 4 
below). Stock market capitalisation increased by 22% from April-August 2009, even though it 
remained far below the historical high of $7779 million in June 2008, and stock market turnover 
is also expected to increase in the last quarter of 2009. 
• In Tanzania, total turnover increased by 228% between Q2 and Q3 of 2009. 
 
Figure 4: Lusaka Stock Exchange All Share Index, 2008-2009 
Source: Zambia case study. 
 
2.1.2 Foreign direct investment 
FDI inflows to developing countries were expected to be more resilient to the crisis shocks than other 
types of private capital flows and, in 2008, notwithstanding the world economic recession, they 
continued to grow, even though at a much slower rate than in the previous year. However, FDI to the 
developing world is likely to have fallen for the first year in the decade to 2009. The case studies 
highlight that a decline in FDI was already visible in a number of countries beginning in mid-2008, and 
this downward trend continued in 2009. In Cambodia, net FDI inflows experienced a significant drop in 
mid-2008 and are estimated to have fallen by 50% in 2009, hitting in particular the garment and 
tourism sectors (see Figure 5). In Bolivia, FDI flows reduced sharply in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 
this pattern continued in the first two quarters of 2009. 
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Figure 5: Cambodia FDI inflows, 1992-2009 
 
Note: BoP = balance of payments. GDP = gross domestic product. 
Source: Cambodia case study.  
 
Some African countries have experienced sharp declines in FDI. In DRC, FDI decreased sharply to $374 
million in 2009 from $1713 million in 2008. Uganda experienced a drop of 6.2% in 2007/08-2008/09. 
In Ethiopia, flows declined progressively from Q2 of 2008 to Q1 of 2009, when they were down by 31%, 
but seem to have rebounded in Q2 of that year. In Sudan, FDI is expected to decline in 2009 given 
adverse effects of the crisis on many key Arab investors, who have seen significant losses, especially in 
US and European stock markets, as well as declining oil revenues. 
 
Nevertheless, there are still a number of countries where FDI inflows have continued to increase 
despite the crisis. This is the case, for example, for Kenya and Zambia. In the latter, however, because 
of the crisis, there was a switch in the direction of FDI flows, from the mining, energy and manufacturing 
sectors to the real estate, manufacturing and services sectors. Moreover, in Tanzania, despite the 
increase in FDI, a few planned investments were cancelled and postponed4 in 2009, and the Tanzania 
Investment Centre recorded a drop of about 30% in the value of new investments during the first half of 
2009 compared with the same period in 2008. In Mozambique, FDI increased significantly in January-
September 2009, but a number of investment projects have been withdrawn or postponed, especially 
in the industry and tourism sectors.5
 
 
2.1.3 International bank lending 
Data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Consolidated Banking Statistics point to a drop 
of more than 13% in international banks’ claims to developing countries in March 2009 compared with 
June 2008, when they reached their highest level. From March 2009 up to September 2009 there were 
modest signs of a slight recovery.  
 
The case studies indicate that some countries were likely to be particularly exposed to a drop in 
international bank lending, since they were characterised by a high degree of foreign-owned banks. In 
Kenya, for example, financial reforms have encouraged foreign banks to enter and expand banking 
operations, so that in 2007 there were 11 foreign banks, which represented a quarter of all banks and 
accounted for about 40% of commercial banks’ core capital. Nevertheless, there seems to be no 
evidence that the share of foreign banks changed in 2008 and 2009 because of the crisis or that 
foreign parent banks withdrew funds in Kenya in order to offset losses in home countries. It must be 
said that data from BIS do indicate such effects for African countries.  
 
                                                            
4 The Tanzania case study reports that a $3.5 billion investment plan in aluminium smelting, a $165 million nickel mining 
project, a Canadian investment in telecoms and a $250 million Swedish investment in ethanol were scaled down in 2009. 
5 The Mozambique case study reports that the Corridor Sands titanium project in Chibuto, worth $700 million, was postponed. 
The iron company Arcelor Mitall suspended production in April 2009 and cancelled its expansion project. The Highland African 
Mining company suspended activities in May 2009, laying off 314 workers. In the tourism sector, nine touristic complexes 
have been affected by demand reduction, resulting in 106 workers losing their jobs. 
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On the other hand, there are countries where banks’ ownership structure or country regulations meant 
that effects on international bank lending were limited, for example Sudan and Zambia.  
 
2.1.4 Domestic banking systems 
The country case studies also examined domestic banking systems, looking at how vulnerable these 
are to the crisis shocks and to what extent they have been affected by the crisis so far.  
 
The Tanzania, Kenya and Cambodia case studies reported that their domestic banking systems had 
remained relatively sound in the face of the crisis, even though signs of strain became evident in 2008 
and in particular in 2009, especially in Cambodia.  
 
• In Tanzania, banks’ profitability increased in 2009. The average capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 
stood well above its benchmark, and the gross non-performing loans (NPLs) ratio was well 
below the international standard. Moreover, bank lending to the private sector grew by about 
27% during 2009 up to September.  
• In Kenya, CARs stood well above the minimum required. However, the NPLs/assets ratio, which 
had declined significantly in 2008, increased from 3.4% in August 2008 to 3.7% in August 
2009. Banks’ profitability as measured by return on assets (ROA) decreased slightly, from 4.11% 
in 2007 to 4.03% in 2008. 
• In Cambodia, liquidity ratios improved from 81% at end-2008 to 93% in August 2009, and CARs 
rose as well. Nevertheless, NPLs as a share of total loans increased from 3.7% at end-December 
2008 to 5.9% in August 2009,6
 
 and are expected to reach a level of 10% by end-2009. 
Moreover, compared with 2008, growth of private sector credit was 4% by August 2009 on a 
year-on-year basis (which is low compared with previous years). 
On the other hand, a number of country case studies stressed that the domestic banking sector was 
exposed to the shocks and was affected significantly by the crisis, especially in 2009.  
 
• In Bolivia, bank lending increased at a slower rate in 2009 compared with the previous year, 
increasing the gap between total lending volumes and deposits.  
• In Sudan, the ratio of NPLs to gross loans was high and the CAR declined sharply from 23% in 
2007 to 11% in 2008.  
• In DRC, banking finance dried up as a result of the crisis through weaker commodity prices. 
• In Zambia, the banking sector was adversely affected by the crisis in 2009 because of its 
linkages with the tourism, mining and agriculture sectors. The NPLs to total assets ratio almost 
doubled, from 7% in the first quarter of 2009 to 13% in the third quarter of 2009. The loan loss 
provision to NPL ratio declined from 100% in December 2008 to 85% in September 2009 (Figure 
6). Banks’ profitability collapsed: the return on equity (ROE) significantly declined in the last 
two quarters of 2008 and continued to fall, from 24% in January 2009 to 20% in September 
2009. ROA declined from 4% to 1.4% during the same period (Figure 7). The CAR also dropped 
from 19% in September 2008 to 16% in February 2009, but then increased continuously up to 
20% in September 2009, probably pointing to a first sign of recovery in the banking system. 
Finally, in 2009 credit conditions became tighter and banks reduced their lending to 
households as well as sectors perceived to be risky, such as medium and small-scale 
enterprises, agriculture and manufacturing. 
 
  
                                                            
6 Note, however, that this is still a low level considering the past rapid expansion experienced by credit in Cambodia. 
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Figure 6: Zambia selected financial soundness indicators, Jun 2008-Sep 2009 (%) 
 
Source: Zambia case study. 
 
 
Figure 7: Zambia banks’ profitability indicators, Jun 2008-Sep 2009 (%) 
Source: Zambia case study. 
 
 
Table 2 shows which countries have seen their domestic banking sectors become affected by the 
global economic and financial crisis over 2008 and 2009. 
 
 
Table 2: Selected countries – domestic banking systems affected by crisis in 2008 and 2009 
  2008 2009 
Bangladesh     
Bolivia No Yes  
Cambodia No No* 
DRC    Yes 
Ethiopia     
Kenya No* No* 
Mozambique     
Sudan Yes Yes 
Tanzania No No 
Uganda     
Zambia No Yes 
Notes: ‘No’ countries are classified as those with weak domestic banking systems and/or which experienced a 
deterioration in some of their banks’ financial soundness indicators because of the crisis; ‘Yes’ countries are 
classified as those with sound domestic banking systems and/or which experienced an improvement in some of 
their banks’ financial soundness indicators despite the crisis. *Denotes first signs of strain. Empty cells mean that 
information has not been provided. 
Source: Based on country case studies.  
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Ju
n-
08
S
ep
-0
8
D
ec
-0
8
Ja
n-
09
Fe
b-
09
M
ar
-0
9
A
pr
-0
9
M
ay
-0
9
Ju
n-
09
Ju
l-0
9
A
ug
-0
9
S
ep
-0
9
N
P
Ls to assets
Lo
an
 lo
ss
 to
 N
P
L
Loan loss provision to NPL Past due advances (NPLs) to total assets 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Ju
n-
08
S
ep
-0
8
D
ec
-0
8
Ja
n-
09
Fe
b-
09
M
ar
-0
9
A
pr
-0
9
M
ay
-0
9
Ju
n-
09
Ju
l-0
9
A
ug
-0
9
S
ep
-0
9
R
O
A
R
O
E
Return on equity Return on average assets 
  9 
2.2 Trade and sector effects 
 
The case studies identify trade shocks transmitted through price and/or volume effects.7 We expect 
countries more open to trade and finance to be more severely affected – recent data substantiate this 
for Cambodia. No country reported difficulties in trade finance, which Baldwin and Evenett (2009) 
initially claimed contributed to the October 2008collapse in global trade,8
 
 or an increase in 
protectionism in destination markets. We know now that trade finance did not play an major role. 
However, demand continues to be weaker in some markets for some producers compared with others 
within the same product category: there is a clear export performance difference between Ethiopia and 
Kenya in horticulture and Bangladesh and Cambodia in garments. Commodity prices have yet to 
recover to pre-crisis peaks for some products, and investments in the minerals sector have been 
postponed (DRC, Zambia and Tanzania), with resultant employments effects.  
 
The case studies suggest a differentiated impact across countries and within countries, across firms, in 
terms of: susceptibility to reduced consumer demand in crisis-affected markets (elasticities across 
product categories matter); and the ability to absorb the trade shock in terms of the nature of 
production (role of backward linkages, dependence on FDI), as well as concomitant actions taken by 
competitors (such as exchange rate depreciations). We present the key findings below. 
 
2.2.1 Trade openness  
The countries vary in terms of dependence on trade, openness to trade and finance and exchange rate 
management. Cambodia, Bolivia, Mozambique, Zambia, Uganda, Kenya and DRC are more at ‘open’ 
compared with Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania and Bangladesh (Table 3). However, all exhibit high 
dependence on a few commodities (accounting for 35% to 90% of total exports) or, in Cambodia and 
Bangladesh, a single product group: garments (knit and woven) (Table 4). All countries also have high 
dependence on a single market: the European Union (EU), US or China.  
 
Table 3: Openness indicators  
 
C
am
b
o
d
ia
 
(2
0
0
7)
 
B
o
li
vi
a 
(2
0
0
8
) 
M
o
za
m
b
iq
u
e 
(2
0
0
8
) 
Za
m
b
ia
 
(2
0
0
8
) 
U
ga
n
d
a 
(2
0
0
7)
 
K
en
ya
 (
2
0
0
7)
 
D
R
C
 (
2
0
0
8
) 
Et
h
io
p
ia
 
(2
0
0
8
) 
S
u
d
an
 (
2
0
0
8
) 
Ta
n
za
n
ia
 
(2
0
0
6
) 
B
an
gl
ad
es
h
 
(2
0
0
7)
 
Trade openness 
ratioa 
0.7 0.41 0.37 0.36 0.27 0.3 0.28 0.2 0.22 0.25 0.25 
Ito-Chinn Financial 
Openness Indexb 
1.27 1.22 -1.13 2.54 2.54 1.18 - -1.13 -0.8 -1.13 -1.13 
Exchange rate 
regimec 
Man. 
float 
Peg Man. 
float  
Indp. 
float  
Man. 
float 
Man. 
float 
Indp. 
float  
Peg  Man. 
float 
Man. 
float  
Fixed 
peg 
Notes: a = Trade openness ratio calculated as a proportion of GDP (sum of imports and exports divided by two, 
then by GDP). The closer to 1 the more open to trade is the economy. b = Financial Openness Index is taken from 
Ito and Chinn (2007) calculated based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions – a higher value indicates greater financial openness. c = Based on de facto classification of 
exchange rate regimes and monetary policy frameworks IMF as of 31 April 2008.  
Source: Data from World Development Indicators (WDI) for most recent year unless otherwise indicated.  
                                                            
7 The inventory effect arguably has more relevance for capital-intensive goods than low-skilled manufactures and traditional 
commodities. For firms in tightly integrated production networks, a sudden stop in final demand is expected to reverberate 
quickly, as firms run down their inventories to adjust to persistent changes in their market; this inventory effect magnifies 
demand shocks and is principally to blame for the initial collapse of trade in manufactures from September 2008 to June 2009 
(Escaith, 2009).  
8 The debate on the reasons for the unprecedented decline in global trade flows continues, however, the role of trade finance 
is being somewhat more downplayed (not least given the various types). Baldwin (in Beattie, 2010) notes that a fall in demand 
driven by the postponing of consumption was the chief cause of the decline in global trade flows from October 2008, in 
response to an expectations shock; others point out that increases in global trade to incomes elasticities since the 1980s 
amplified the recessionary impact on trade flows (Freund, 2009).  
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Table 4: Main exports and markets  
Country Main exportsa Share of total 
exportsb 
Major export 
market(s)c 
Share of total 
exportsd 
Cambodia Garments  83.2% USA 
Hong Kong 
EU 
49.7% 
20.5% 
20.2% 
Sudan Petroleum oils 89.7% China 78.0% 
Bangladesh Garments 71.5% EU 
USA 
50.6% 
26.8% 
DRC Cobalt and copper ores, diamonds 57.4% EU 
China 
39.7% 
34.0% 
Mozambique Aluminium 58.7% EU 
(Unspecified) 
26.7% 
(46.0%) 
Zambia Copper 68.8% (Unspecified) 44.5% 
Bolivia Natural gas  48.2% Brazil 37.0% 
Ethiopia Coffee, sesame seeds 51.9% EU 34.3% 
Kenya Tea, coffee, cut flowers, vegetables 36.8% EU 28.7% 
Uganda Coffee, fish,  34.7% EU 26.1% 
Tanzania Gold, fish, precious metal ores 50.0% EU 21.9% 
Notes: a = Determined at HS chapter level, but the descriptions shown are of the predominant export(s) within 
the chapters identified rather than necessarily of the chapters themselves. b = Share of total exports accounted 
for by the HS chapters into which the main exports in the previous column fall in the most recent three years for 
which data available: i.e. 2005-2007 own data for Bangladesh, Bolivia, Tanzania; 2005-2008 (excluding 2007) 
own data for Sudan; 2006-2008 own data for Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Uganda, Zambia; 2006-2008 mirror 
data for Cambodia, DRC. c = Any market accounting for 20% or more of total export value. d = For the same years 
as given in note (b), except for Cambodia, for which the share in this column is based on 2002-2004 own data.  
Source: International Trade Centre (ITC) calculations based on UN ComTrade data, obtained from ITC Trade Map 
(on 5 January 2010). 
 
2.2.2 Garments 
Cambodia and Bangladesh both exhibit high dependence on readymade garment (RMG) exports (see 
Table 4). Phase 1 project outputs showed that Bangladesh had managed to increase its exports to the 
US since October 2008, whereas Cambodia’s share had declined. This was also the case in the EU 
market. However, more recent data show that Bangladesh is now experiencing a decline in demand for 
its products in the US market; this suggests a lagged impact of reduced demand as well as increased 
competition from larger players such as China. 
 
Bangladesh’s RMG exports destined for the US market fell by almost one-third in value terms between 
January and October 2009, compared with the same period in 2008.9 However, the EU is a far more 
important market for Bangladesh: in 2008/09 around 58.5% of total RMG exports from Bangladesh 
were destined for the EU.10 RMG exports (in value terms) from Bangladesh have continued to grow in 
the EU market and were up 12% in July 2009 compared with July 2008, compared with increases of 5% 
in the same period for Chinese and Cambodian products.11
 
  
Cambodia’s decline in garment exports continues to be steep. Data presented in the Cambodia case 
study suggest that export values were down by 19% for the first nine months of 2009 compared with 
the same period in 2008; volumes over the same period declined by about 16%. Exports (on a month-
on-month basis) have fallen consistently since November 2008, and the decline continues to be steep: 
-24% growth in exports destined to the US in April 2009 compared with March 2009. Most recently 
reported import data from the US suggest that this decline is continuing. The Cambodian case study 
                                                            
9 According to the Bangladesh case study, a decomposition analysis of export growth dynamics (totals) reveals that most of 
the growth in 2008 to 2009 was achieved by means of an increase of volumes supplied at lower prices, the resultant impact 
being lower profit margins for exporters. 
10 Compared with approximately 25% in Cambodia, which has a much higher dependence on the US market. 
11 Calculated on the basis of HS61 and HS62.  
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also suggested underlying competitive issues contributing to the steep decline – e.g. the expiry of 
US/EU import safeguards against Chinese imports.  
  
According to the Bangladesh case study, the continued decline in garment imports into the US market 
has been accompanied by changes in market shares among suppliers (see Box 1). Although Cambodia 
has clearly experienced a decline in the value of its exports to the US market, this decline has been less 
severe for Bangladesh and China, which has gained market share. Reductions in export volumes and 
values and changes in market share among producers are less apparent in the EU market. In general, in 
both markets, year-on-year seasonal variation is high, making it difficult to distinguish a clear declining 
trend at this time.  
 
Box 1: Changing market shares in US and EU markets 
China’s share of the US market increased by almost 5% between January and September 2009; Bangladesh’s increased 
marginally by almost 1%; Cambodia’s declined by around 0.5% despite a 25% reduction in export values, which indicates 
the gravity of reduced demand in the US market. Competitors have not been able to make dramatic gains in market share 
because the market is contracting. As in the US market, China is by far the leading source of RMG in the EU market, and 
managed to increase its share in both 2008 and 2009. However, Bangladesh also managed to increase its market share in 
both years, and by a larger percentage in 2009 than China (1.3% compared with China’s 0.4%).  
 
Share and rank of suppliers in the EU market 
 2007 2008 2009 (to Sep) Rank 2009 
China 37.7 42.6 43.0 1 
Turkey 15.4 13.2 12.3 2 
Bangladesh 7.6 8.0 9.3 3 
India 6.6 6.6 8.0 4 
Tunisia 4.4 4.3 4.1 5 
Morocco 4.4 4.0 3.6 6 
Source: Eurostat (2009); as reported in Bangladesh case study.  
 
2.2.3 Horticulture and cut flower exporters  
Kenya accounted for just over 40% of EU imports of leguminous vegetables in value terms (23% in 
volume terms) in 2008, and just over 40% of imports of cut flowers in both volume and value terms. In 
comparison, Ethiopia accounted for around 1% of EU imports of leguminous vegetables, and around 
10% of cut flowers (in both volume and value terms in each case). It has experienced rapid growth in 
cut flower exports destined for the EU in recent years (see Table 5).12 This trend continued into 2009: 
exports of cut flowers (both volume and values) in the first 10 months of 2009 had already surpassed 
their annual total for 2008.13
 
  
Table 5: Cut flower exports to the EU, 2000-2009 
  Ethiopia Kenya Tanzania Zambia 
 1000kg €m 1000kg €m 1000kg €m 1000kg €m 
2000 220 0.6 40,725 154.4 2252 8.5 3412 18.5 
2001 233 1.0 43,808 178.9 2374 10.0 3303 18.4 
2002 256 1.4 49,118 198.0 2106 8.3 3855 21.9 
2003 672 3.3 54,958 209.5 1662 6.2 3128 17.2 
2004 1382 5.2 67,680 236.4 1379 5.0 3070 14.0 
2005 3546 9.7 77,731 267.1 1538 5.4 3201 13.4 
2006 7903 21.8 88,077 313.6 1878 5.9 2951 12.4 
2007 15,274 39.1 90,891 322.6 2850 10.9 3554 16.1 
2008 21,931 67.5 95,729 370.4 3008 11.4 3263 17.2 
Jan-Oct 2009 23,550 74.9 75,798 283.0 1913 8.6 2383 13.2 
Note: Calculated on the basis of HS0603. Source: Eurostat. 
                                                            
12 It has the lowest unit value for both product categories compared with Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia. 
13 Exports of leguminous vegetables for the first nine months of 2009 surpassed their total annual value as of 2008, but not volume.  
  12 
Table 6: Leguminous vegetable exports to the EU, 2000-2009 
 Ethiopia Kenya Tanzania Zambia 
 1000kg €m 1000kg €m 1000kg €m 1000kg €m 
2000 3581 6.0 30,692 94.4 47 0.2 3382 7.1 
2001 3155 5.2 25,831 74.3 308 1.0 4716 9.5 
2002 2070 3.7 26,037 75.6 375 1.3 2663 5.0 
2003 2837 4.3 29,605 81.7 250 0.8 2581 3.9 
2004 3555 5.2 37,603 106.7 1286 4.8 3159 9.2 
2005 4576 6.9 41,037 121.7 1470 6.1 2754 9.4 
2006 4723 12.5 45,805 146.0 1149 4.0 2134 8.9 
2007 3405 7.1 49,778 157.3 535 1.8 2412 10.0 
2008 3412 5.0 51,505 155.8 623 2.0 2384 8.5 
2009 3385 7.0 38,424 109.6 512 1.6 1345 5.6 
Note: Calculated on the basis of HS0708. 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
In the case of Ethiopia, declines in wholesale market prices for cut flowers in the Netherlands meant 
that the country earned only 47% of a projected $280 million from flower exports in FY2008/09,14
 
 which 
resulted in the inability of some producers to service debts to the Development Bank of Ethiopia.  
Between January and August 2009, Kenyan horticultural exports declined by 35% in volume terms 
compared with the same period in 2008. This is attributed mainly to a decline in cut flower exports. 
More than half of the over 200 flower exporters registered in Kenya are reported to be on the verge of 
closing; smaller farms are being especially hard hit as a result of reduced market opportunities and 
earnings, increasing costs of production and diminishing water supplies. Compared with Ethiopia, a 
slowdown in Kenya’s cut flower exports is clear. But the slowdown in the EU market for cut flower 
imports has been less severe than that reported by Kenyan exporters (see Table 7). This indicates a 
more varied impact across producers than aggregate export figures are able to reveal.  
 
Table 7: EU cut flower imports, 2008-2009  
 Extra-EU27 Kenya Ethiopia 
 1000kg €m 1000kg €m 1000kg €m 
Jan-Aug 2008 150,264 594 63,998 247 14,494 44 
Jan-Aug 2009 146,791 583 60,670 230 18,448 59 
% change (2009/2008) -2% -2% -5% -7% 27% 35% 
Jan-Oct 2008 188,408 751 49,409 307 18,106 55 
Jan-Oct 2009 184,754 727 75,798 283 23,550 75 
% change (2009/2008) -2% -3% -5% -8% 30% 37% 
Note: Calculated on the basis of HS0603. 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
2.2.4 Tourism 
There was a reported 10% decline in the number of tourists arriving in mainland Tanzania in January to 
April 2009 compared with January to April 2008.15
  
 Consequently, the revenue obtained from arrivals 
declined to $302.1 million in the period January to April 2009 compared with $388.2 million for the 
same period in 2008. There was a sharp drop in tourist arrivals in Zambia too. 
In Kenya, the tourism sector suffered a series of major blows during 2008, including post-election 
violence and increased oil prices, in addition to the impacts of the global financial crisis. Tourist 
                                                            
14 The Ethiopian case study notes that a single rose stem from a farm in Ethiopia was sold for, on average, €0.13 in 2008/09. 
The same item is now sold for €0.11 in EU markets, a 15% decline in prices. In peak seasons, the price for a stem used to be on 
average €1, but in 2009 prices were unable to exceed €0.20.  
15 214,733 registered tourists arrivals in January-April 2009 compared with 238,139 for the same period in 2008. 
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arrivals declined by 33.9% and dollar earnings from arrivals by 19.9% in 2008 compared with 2007. 
There was some recovery in 2009:16 between January and September 2009, tourist arrivals increased by 
38.7% compared with the same period in 2008; by November 2009, tourism arrivals and earnings were 
up 90% from 2008.17
 
 Visa charges were reduced between 2008 and 2009, from $50 to $25, and fees 
for children were waived.  
2.2.5 Commodities  
Following the precipitous drop in commodity prices after October 2008, commodities exported by the 
countries in this study experienced an increase in prices: by January 2010, the prices of copper and 
gold exceeded pre-crisis levels by some margin (Table 8).  
 
Table 8: Commodity price developments, 2006-Jan 2010  
  Crude 
oil, avg, 
spot 
Natural 
gas, US 
Coffee, 
Arabica 
Coffee, 
Robusta 
Tea, 
Mombasa 
auctions 
Aluminium  Copper Gold 
  $/bbl $/mmbtu ¢/kg ¢/kg ¢/kg $/mt $/mt $/toz 
2006 64 7 252 149 195 2570 6722 604 
2007 71 7 272 191 166 2638 7118 697 
2008 97 9 308 232 222 2573 6956 872 
2009 62 4 317 164 252 1665 5150 973 
         
Jan-09 44 5 283 182 219 1413 3221 859 
Feb-09 42 5 285 177 212 1330 3315 943 
Mar-09 47 4 283 168 212 1336 3750 924 
Apr-09 50 3 297 167 221 1421 4407 890 
May-09 58 4 333 167 222 1460 4569 929 
Jun-09 69 4 330 163 241 1574 5014 946 
Jul-09 65 3 311 158 267 1668 5216 934 
Aug-09 72 3 330 160 280 1934 6165 949 
Sep-09 68 3 327 163 297 1834 6196 997 
Oct-09 74 4 341 162 261 1879 6288 1043 
Nov-09 78 4 336 153 286 1949 6676 1127 
Dec-09 75 5 349 154 298 2180 6982 1135 
Jan-10 77 6 350 154 285 2235 7386 1118 
Source: World Bank Commodity Price Data (Pink Sheet), various issues.  
 
Soft commodity exporters (e.g. goods that are hard to stock or reduce in consumption) 
Kenya is the world’s largest exporter of black teas.18 Between January and September 2009, tea output 
declined by 12% compared with the same period in 2008 – the lowest output in five years. This is 
attributed in part to a failure to use fertiliser in 2008 and 2009 because of its high cost. The Kenyan Tea 
Development Agency has only recently resumed importing fertiliser following its suspension because of 
high prices. Kenya’s income from tea exports increased by 17% in the first half of 2009 compared with 
the same period in 2008.19
 
 Volatility in tea prices and subsequent impacts on outputs have had major 
implications for poverty, given that the sector is dominated by small-scale growers. Tea institutions are 
currently lobbying for tea to be classified as a food item for domestic consumption in order to exempt it 
from VAT and therefore spur local demand.  
In Uganda, coffee export earnings fell in 2009 compared with 2008. Coffee prices slumped by 20% in 
the third quarter of 2008/09 compared with the same period in 2007/08; coffee volume slumped by 
5.4% during the same period. 
 
                                                            
16 This suggests that post-election violence has had more of an impact on arrival numbers than the crisis. 
17This is attributed to aggressive marketing by the Kenya Tourist Board in customary source markets such as Europe.  
18 Tea accounts for 4% of GDP and 14% of agricultural GDP. 
19 KSh30.8 billion compared with KSh26.3 billion.  
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In Ethiopia, coffee is the single most important export commodity, and responsible for declines in total 
export values since 2009: the unit value of coffee exports has declined since the highs of 2008 as a result 
of price declines on world markets and volumes sold (see Table 9).  
  
Table 9: Ethiopian coffee exports, 2007-2009  
 Coffee 
Value Volume Price ($/kg) 
2007 Q1 110.67 42.62 2.60 
 Q2 154.66 62.24 2.48 
 Q3 92.38 33.96 2.72 
 Q4 52.56 17.87 2.94 
2008 Q1 191.90 61.08 3.14 
 Q2 187.65 57.84 3.24 
 Q3 133.29 44.00 3.03 
 Q4 41.71 15.19 2.75 
2009 Q1 75.91 28.41 2.67 
 Q2 124.96 46.40 2.69 
 Q3 104.70 35.32 2.96 
Note: Ethiopia’s financial year runs from 8-7 July.  
Source: Ethiopia case study. 
 
Hard commodity exporters (e.g. products that can easily be stocked) 
Copper is the main source of foreign exchange for Zambia and accounts for 68-82% (depending on the 
source and year) of total foreign exchange earnings. The improvement in the trade balance for Zambia 
by the second and third quarters of 2009 was driven by an improvement of copper and other 
commodity prices on international markets. A trade surplus was recorded in May 2009, the first since 
July 2008 (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Trade balance in Zambia, 2008-2009 (US$ millions) 
Source: Zambia case study.  
 
The price of copper almost doubled from $3221/mt in January 2009 to $6196/mt in September 2009 
(see Table 8). The rise in copper prices coincided with an increase in copper production and the 
opening of a major new mine in December 2008 in Zambia after the peak of the crisis in 2008.  
  
The global financial crisis contributed to a collapse in the share price of DRC mining companies in the 
latter part of 2008, making it impossible for them to finance investments with rights issues, at the 
same time as banking finance dried up.20 The main casualty of lower international copper prices is 
artisanal mining: it is reported that 73.5% of mining jobs were lost between December 2008 and April 
2009 in Katanga province.21
                                                            
20 The mining sector in DRC contributes between 70% and 80% of total export earnings and around 8% of GDP. 
 Since March 2009, some of the mining companies that had previously 
21 As of January 2009, 46 mining companies had closed (63% of total registered) and 19 companies had scaled down their 
operations (25%). 
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scaled down operations have subsequently reopened. However, despite the upturn in prices since the 
second quarter of 2009, production has not yet reached pre-crisis levels.22
 
 The trade balance for DRC is 
projected to shift from a surplus of about 1% of GDP in 2008 to a deficit of about 15% in 2009. 
Zambia and DRC are two economies with a lot of common traits, e.g. undiversified production and 
export basis and high land to labour ratios. In particular, their high dependence on the mining sector 
implies that the main effect of the crisis on both economies is via the trade channel (via international 
demand for their major minerals). However, the impact of the crisis on the mining sector (and thus the 
general impact of the crisis) has been different in the two countries. The most visible difference in 
result is that in DRC the sector has shed hundreds of thousands of jobs while in Zambia only 8500 
miners have lost their jobs so far. 
 
Moving beyond the case study, this difference may reflect different production structures in the two 
sectors: Zambian mining is dominated by copper, which is capital intensive, with a few large 
international firms making up the bulk of it. These firms have been able to rely on their own capital to 
limit the extent to which they have had to cut back their operations. And now that the copper price is 
increasing they are starting to rehire workers (1500 miners in the past few months). Mining in DRC is 
more labour intensive, because of the types of minerals mined in the country (e.g. diamonds, coltan, 
gold), combined with the insecure conditions in the country (especially in the areas where minerals are 
concentrated). This has resulted in a composition of the sector largely skewed towards micro 
enterprises and individual workers who do the digging and the transformation process informally and 
with very little capital. The traders rather than the workers are able to appropriate most of the value in 
the supply chain in the country, as they set the price to be paid to the workers. This implies that, in 
times of crisis, the effects of a drop in the international price are particularly painful for workers and 
small informal firms, as they cannot use any precautionary savings to withstand the hard times. In 
Katanga province, which relies on diamond production, over 70% of miners lost their jobs (around 
20,000 in that province alone). Considering that each of them is likely to have four to five dependants 
on average, and that goods and services are sourced locally, the effects on the local economy have 
been dramatic.  
 
On top of the crisis, DRC also experienced a security shock in 2009, with the intensification of fighting 
in the Kivu region (one of the richest mining areas). This has further reduced mining intensity there and 
has forced the government to step up military expenditures, with pressure on inflation and on the 
interest rate.  
 
There are lessons from these different responses to the crisis. Poor security and governance can 
seriously aggravate any shock hitting the economy, as in DRC. Relatively good macroeconomic 
management along with a relatively stable social and political environment have played a role in 
making Zambia fairly resilient to the crisis.  
 
The crisis has also exposed some important challenges that mining-dependent countries still face, 
primarily those relating to fiscal policy. For instance, before 2008 Zambia had one of the lowest mineral 
tax regimes in the world, which prevented it from benefiting significantly from booming copper prices 
through enhanced public revenues. Major reforms were introduced early in 2008, but many of these 
were reversed in 2009 in response to job losses in the mines following the sharp fall in copper prices in 
mid 2008. Tax policy for the mining sector is possibly a second order problem in DRC, given the gravity 
of the other issues facing the country, including security and lack of a formal sector. However, tax 
policy is something that mining-dependent countries need to be cautious about in order to maximise 
the benefits of natural resources wealth and to be prepared for swings in international demand for 
minerals. 
 
                                                            
22 Sectoral activity in the extractive industries was still declining as of the second quarter of 2009 (-3.7% quarter on quarter), 
although at a slower rate compared with the first quarter of 2009 (-6.7%) and the last quarter of 2008 (-11%). 
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Oil accounts for more than 95% of Sudan’s total exports. As a result of reduced oil prices on world 
markets, it is projected that the total value of Sudan’s exports will decline from $12.9 billion in 2008 to 
a record low of $5.3 billion in 2009.  
 
In Mozambique, it is reported that the value of exports of goods between January and September 2009 
fell by 37% compared with the same period in 2008.23 This reduction was mainly the result of a 50% fall 
in the price of aluminium, which accounted for 72% of the decline.24
 
 As export values have fallen much 
more than import values, this has resulted in a considerable deterioration of the trade balance. It 
should be said, however, that changes in the trade balance in Mozambique have little direct relation 
with development, given that the trade balance is dominated by mega projects. 
In Tanzania, the mining sector has been affected by recent world price declines. The price of diamonds 
fell by 26% between September 2008 and April 2009: from $8870 to $6608 per carat. In comparison, 
gold has benefited from price increases, given its use as a principal financial asset. The crisis affected 
tanzanite mining companies and small-scale miners most severely, owing to a 50% decline in the price 
of tanzanite in world markets since 2009. Investment in Tanzania’s mining sector was forecast to 
decrease by more than 50% in 2009 – from $90 million to $40 million – as indicated by recent declines 
in requests for mining licences. Only 15 licences were granted between January and April 2009, 
compared with 76 for the same period in 2008 (Table 10).  
 
Table 10: Mining licences granted for mining activities in Tanzania, 2007-2009 
 2007 2008 2009 (Jan-Apr) 
Prospecting licences with reconnaissance  155 224 15 
Prospecting licences 607 1169 72 
Special mining licences  1 0 0 
Mining licenses 28 69 9 
Primary mining licenses 1863 3573 678 
Source: Tanzania case study.  
 
In Bolivia, mineral prices experienced a large drop during 2008Q4 (by 53.8%), although they 
subsequently picked up by 10.1% during 2009Q1 and by 55.5% during 2009Q2. Overall, the value of 
Bolivia’s mining exports fell by 18.5% during the period September 2008 to October 2009. 
 
2.2.6 Imports  
The value of imports has fallen in a few countries as a result of a drop in import prices. In Zambia, 
imported inflation as a result of the global fuel price increases of 2008 was relieved somewhat during 
2009. This is the result of exchange rate appreciation, further to an increase in the price of copper, 
which reduced pass-through effects; inflation declined from 16% after January 2009 to reach 12.3% as 
of October 2009. In Bangladesh – a net food and fuel importer, where global food prices drive 
inflationary trends – it is reported that imported food price inflation has fallen since October 2008 and 
reached a low of 2.3% in June 2009 (although since then has started to rise).25
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
23 From $2045 million in January to September 2008 to $1285 million in Jan-Sep 2009. 
24 A reduction in export values for other products in Jan-Sep 2009 compared with Jan-Sep 2008 is also reported: prawns (-
66.7%), sugar (-39%), cotton (-47.8%), cashews (-64.4%), tobacco (-14%), gas (-29%) and wood (-37.5%).  
25 At the same time, food inflation in Bangladesh reached its all time low (0.3%). 
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Figure 9: Inflationary trends in Bangladesh, 2006-2009 (%) 
 
Source: Bangladesh case study. 
 
Kenya’s current account deficit was considered marginally sustainable pre-crisis.26
 
 As shown by Table 
11, while oil imports are down more than 25% as of August 2009 compared with August 2008 in value 
terms, imports of other capital goods (machinery, transport and equipment) are up.  
Table 11: Kenyan imports c.i.f., 2007-2009 (US$ millions)  
  Year to 
Dec 
2007 
2008 
Q1 
2008 
Q2 
2008 
Q3 
2008 
Q4 
Year 
2008 
Year to 
Aug 
2008 
Year to 
Aug 
2009 
% change 
Aug 08/09 
Oil 1919 692 739 1081 540 3051 2869 2142 -25.3 
Chemicals 1156 359 363 384 339 1446 1358 1363 0.4 
Manufactured 
goods 
1435 357 379 409 445 1589 1521 1471 -3.3 
Machinery & 
transport equip. 
2800 709 666 862 825 3063 2888 3043 5.4 
Other 1752 471 434 439 582 1925 2033 2334 14.8 
Total 9062 2588 2582 3174 2730 11074 10670 10299 -3.5 
Source: Kenya case study. 
 
2.2.7 Exchange rate developments  
Kenya’s real effective exchange rate appreciated by 10% between June 2008 and September 2009; 
foreign exchange reserves declined from almost five months of import cover as of 15 January 2008 to 
3.3 months of import cover as of 15 January 2009, below the statutory minimum of 4 months of import 
cover. The valuation losses were partially caused by the appreciation of the US dollar against major 
currencies. However, following an increased allocation of special drawing rights (SDRs) by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), borrowing from the IMF under its Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) in 
May 2009 and purchases by the central bank from the domestic interbank market, foreign exchange 
reserves subsequently increased to 4.1 months as of September 2009 (Table 12). 
 
Table 12: Exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves in Kenya, 2008-2009 
 2008 2009 
 Jul Aug Sep Dec  Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep 
KSh per US$ 66.70 67.68 71.41 78.04  77.66 77.85 76.75 76.37 75.60 
Gross forex reserves 
(US$m) 
5616 5287 5012 4641 4620 4370 4822 4830 4810 5235 
Months of import cover  4.4 4.2 3.9 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.6 4.1 
Source: Kenya case study. 
 
                                                            
26 As a result of the food and fuel price crisis, the current account deficit increased from $1.10 billion in 2007 to $2.12 billion 
in 2008, attributed mainly to increases in the cost of oil imports. Moreover, capital outflows caused a depreciation of the 
Kenyan shilling as well as a running down of foreign exchange reserves. The oil bill increased from $739 million in 2008Q2 to 
$1081 million in 2008Q3 but significantly declined to $540 million in 2008Q4 as a result of the fall in international oil prices. 
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The Bank of Tanzania responded to increased demand for foreign exchange after October 2008 by 
intervening in the market to stabilise the value of the Tanzanian shilling. Despite these interventions, 
its value against the US dollar had depreciated by 12.9% in September 2009 compared with September 
2008. Nevertheless, the shilling has been maintained within a narrow band against the US dollar 
further to interventions by the Tanzanian central bank.  
 
By the second half of 2008 and going into 2009, inflationary pressures reduced sharply in Bolivia. The 
central bank subsequently discontinued its policy of allowing the exchange rate to appreciate and 
targeted a rate of Bs.7.07 per US dollar. In Cambodia, the riel strengthened against the US dollar in 
mid-2008 but has since subsided (inflationary pressures have also abated as a result of declines in 
global fuel prices). It is reported that serious nominal exchange rate fluctuations have been averted by 
interventions by the National Bank of Cambodia, but that these interventions have also been costly in 
terms of reserves and deposits.27
 
 
Figure 10: Bolivian exchange rate developments, 2004-2009 (% change) 
 
Source: Bolivia case study. 
 
Figure 11: Riel/US dollar, 2007-2009 (year-on-year % change) 
 
Source: Cambodia case study. 
 
                                                            
27 It has been argued that the exchange rate must be allowed to assume a greater role in facilitating adjustments in the 
current account position and interventions limited to preventing serious volatility. However, there is a trade-off, given 
Cambodia’s high dependence on the US market for its major exports (garments).  
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Bangladesh Bank has periodically been purchasing (and selling) US dollars from the open market to keep 
the taka-dollar exchange rate stable.28 However, the weakening dollar against major currencies such as 
the euro, Japanese yen and Indian rupee throughout 2009 has meant some depreciation of the taka 
against those currencies.29 It is reported that Bangladeshi exporters to the EU suffered because of an 
appreciation of the taka against the euro in the early months of 2009 (January-March);30
 
 moreover, 
depreciations of the Indian and Pakistani rupee and the Vietnamese dong, and China’s inability to let the 
yuan depreciate, have generally undermined Bangladesh’s competitiveness in its major markets for 
apparels (EU and US).  
2.3 Remittances and migration 
 
2.3.1 Remittances 
Remittances are an important source of external capital for many low-income countries. The first phase of 
the monitoring exercise suggested that the majority of the countries studied were experiencing the first 
signs of impact after the second half of 2008. This was the case particularly in Africa. Growth in remittances 
slowed in the last quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009 for all case studies. The most recent data 
indicate that remittances started to recover in the second quarter of 2009. This will probably mean that 
remittance inflows in 2009 will be close to those in 2008 or even higher in most countries analysed.  
 
Table 13 provides a more complete picture of the evidence so far of remittances before and during the 
crisis. In all of 11 countries that have data going back a few years, remittances grew substantially up to 
2008. For instance, in Ethiopia inflows increased 14-fold between 1998 and 2008, and in Bolivia they 
increased by six times between 2004 and 2007. This growth has made remittances an important source 
of revenues for the countries in the sample: they generally account for between 1% and 5% of GDP, with 
Bangladesh (11%) and Bolivia (7%) the highest. The crisis generally halted or greatly reduced growth in 
the second half of 2008 (Bolivia, Kenya, Uganda) and/or at the beginning of 2009 (Bangladesh, 
Bolivia, Ethiopia). Bangladesh has been the only country for which remittances have continued to grow 
throughout the period, although at a lower rate than in the pre-crisis period (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12: Remittance inflows in Bangladesh – the exception 
 
Source: Bangladesh case study. 
                                                            
28 They have been successful: the taka-dollar exchange rate has remained around the same in the past two years. 
29 China, the major competitor of Bangladesh in the EU and US market (particularly for RMG), kept its currency pegged against 
the US dollar. Consequently, the yuan depreciated by 6.2% against the euro. Between 1 January and 11 November 2009, the 
taka depreciated by 6.3% against the euro, 5.4% against the Indian rupee and 0.2% against the yen and appreciated only 
marginally against the US dollar by 0.3%. 
30 Bangladeshi exporters also suffered when the taka appreciated against the euro in 2008. Exporters in Bangladesh are 
generally reluctant to take forward coverage since the taka has a track record of generally depreciating against major currencies. 
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Table 13: Summary data on effects on remittances 
  Remit 
2007 
(US$m) 
Rem. 
2008 
(US$m) 
Rem./ 
GDP 
2008 
Long-term 
change 
Change from start of 
crisis (Sep 2008) 
Recent months 
Bangladesh 5978 7915 10% From 4% of GDP 
in 2000/01 to 
11% in 2008/09 
Growth 22.4% in 
2008/09 vs. year 
before 
Jul-Oct 2009 
21.2% growth vs. 
year before 
Bolivia 1040 1,089 7% 6-fold increase 
2004-07 
Down by 8.5% in 
2008Q4 and by 11.9% 
in 2009Q1 
Partial recovery 
in 2009Q2 
(7.4%) 
Cambodia 353 Drop 
8% vs. 
2007 
3.4%    
DRC 81 212   Expected decline to 
$135m in 2009 
 
Ethiopia  947 2.9% 14-fold increase 
since 1998 
2-15% monthly drop 
first months of 2009 
 
Kenya 574 611 2.7% Doubled 2004-
2008 
Decline in May 2008-
Jan 2009. First 9 
months 2009 3% drop 
vs. year before 
Upward trend 
from Feb 2009 
Mozambique 99 99 1.3%  No marked change  
Sudan 1769 
(World 
Bank) 
1850 
(World 
Bank) 
3.7% Trebled 2000-
2008 
  
Tanzania 14 
(World 
Bank) 
15 
(World 
Bank) 
0.1%    
Uganda 546 746 6%  2008/09Q4 down by 
11.4% vs. year before 
Increase in 
2009/10Q1 
Zambia 59 68 0.7%  Increase in 2009 
except in Q1 
Expected 20% 
incr. 2009 vs. 
2008 
Source: Case studies. 
 
The slowdown in remittances halted in many countries by 2009Q2. In Kenya, monthly inflows started to 
grow consistently again from February 2009 after a declining trend in the preceding eight months. In 
Bolivia, the (partial) recovery began in the second quarter 2009, whereas Uganda had already 
experienced an increase in remittance inflows again in the first quarter of 2009. Ethiopia appears to be 
the only country with no signs of recovery yet up to June 2009 (Figure 13). The recovery is generally mild 
and remittances are expected to decline in 2009 relative to 2008 in DRC, Ethiopia, Bolivia and 
Cambodia. Zambia and Bangladesh represent the exceptions, with substantial increases in remittances 
expected in Bangladesh even in 2009 (over 2008). 
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Figure 13: Remittance inflows to Ethiopia, 2006-2009 (year-on-year % change) 
Source: Ethiopia case study. 
 
2.3.2 Migration  
Changes in migration underpin such patterns of remittances. Wherever such flows have not modified 
the stock of emigrants from these countries, remittance inflows are likely to recover more quickly. 
 
In the absence of systematic data, however, it is harder to gather proper evidence on migration flows 
and return migration than in the case of remittances. Only the Asian countries in the case studies 
present recent evidence on emigration and return. In particular, Bangladesh experienced a strong 
reduction of 33.7% in the number of persons going abroad for work in FY2008/09 (over the previous 
fiscal year). And the trend continued during the first two months of FY2009/10, recording a fall of 46.5% 
(Figure 14). These trends occurred in the context of increasingly tight conditions in the main destination 
countries. For instance, 12,000 Bangladeshi workers were retrenched in Malaysia and 20,000 in Sudan; 
the Maldives halted hiring Bangladeshi workers. Similarly, Thailand and Malaysia, the top two 
destination countries for Cambodian migrant workers, officially closed their doors to new inflows. It is 
still uncertain whether and when these flows will start to grow again but this will have important 
implications for the future growth of remittance flows. 
 
Figure 14: Number of persons going abroad for work from Bangladesh, 2007-2009 
Source: Bangladesh case study. 
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2.4 Aid 
 
While both Phase 1 and 2 indicated no major pullout of aid, it is likely that there is some impact still to 
come. More positively, the international system (e.g. IMF, regional development banks – RDBs) has 
responded quickly. It is possible to distinguish between bilateral aid responses and responses in 
relation to the international system, including the international financial institutions (IFIs).  
 
Multilaterals have been very active in responding to the crisis. The IMF has increased its lending to low-
income countries from $1.2 billion in 2008 to an expected $4 billion in 2009 and 2010. Conditionalities 
have decreased and the content of these has changed.  
 
The country studies show:  
 
• Recent (2007-2008) declines in aid to Uganda and Bangladesh and recent increases in DRC and 
Cambodia; 
• Some crisis pullouts (e.g. of Irish assistance) but no measurable effects so far, although several 
studies express fear of a decline (e.g. Mozambique, which is one of the most aid-dependent 
countries);  
• Generally, development aid at the country level determined by other factors such as political 
stability (peace and stability in DRC/Sudan ) or political allies (China in Cambodia); 
• A visible increase in IMF activity (DRC, SDR increase in countries such as Zambia, ESF in 
Ethiopia) as well as World Bank activity (DRC, Mozambique, although in some countries 
Regional RDBs played a more significant role (e.g. Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 
Bangladesh and Cambodia); 
• In some countries, such as Mozambique, a World Bank response that seems to be a result more 
of the food price crisis than of the financial crisis.  
 
The expectations on aid seems more subdued (te Velde and Massa, 2009) although recent 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reports show that aid continued to 
increase (albeit at a slower level compared with commitments). However, it is entirely possible that 
global pressures and actual country experience differ for the following reasons: 
 
• Global cuts in aid might be compared with the baseline of sharply increasing aid flows, hence 
aid at country level might still grow. 
• The evidence reported at the country level reflects plans made some time ago, perhaps before 
the crisis.  
• There have been cuts, especially in countries not covered by our selection. 
 
For a summary of aid flows at country level during the financial crisis, see Table A1 in Annex 1. 
 
2.5 Summary: BoP effects 
 
This section summarises BoP effects: how do all the effects come together? Data on the current account 
of the BoP suggest a highly varied picture in recent years. During the global financial crisis:  
 
• The current account was badly affected negatively (DRC, Kenya, Sudan) by $1-2 billion. 
• In Cambodia, Mozambique and Zambia the current account was in surplus but turned (or was 
expected to be) negative in 2009. 
• In Bolivia, the current account had a large surplus, which was dropping in 2009.  
• The current account became more positive (Uganda) or less negative (Tanzania) because the 
terms of trade improved. 
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The global financial crisis led to a number of high risk situations with respect to reserves. For example, 
in DRC, by February 2009 gross official reserves had fallen to the equivalent of less than 1 day of 
imports. The IMF granted $195 million under the Rapid Access Component of the ESF, which increased 
the level of gross official reserves to $237 million, or 1.9 weeks of imports (Figure 15). 
 
The BoP affected the exchange rate. During 2009, Bolivia, Kenya and Cambodia appreciated in real 
effective terms and Bangladesh, DRC, Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique depreciated in real terms 
(although Uganda appreciated later). Sudan was pegged to the euro. Zambia depreciated and then 
appreciated, mirroring the copper price 
 
Figure 15: International reserves in DRC, Jan 2008-Mar 2009 (in US$ end of the month) 
 
Source: DRC case study. 
 
For a summary of the BoP situation in case study countries, see Table A2 in Annex 1. 
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3. Growth and development effects 
 
3.1 National-level growth, investment and employment 
 
The crisis has had different growth effects in different countries. One indication is the difference in 
growth forecasts for 2009 made in 2008 and at the end of 2009 (Figure 16). Cambodia, dependent on 
external sectors and struck by various crises (conflict and financial), has been affected most (estimates 
of close to 8% loss in GDP as a result of the crisis). This is followed by Kenya, which has also been 
affected by drought and a political crisis. Sudan and DRC have been affected because of oil and mining 
prices and large drops in capital inflows. There are also a number of countries that have been affected 
in specific sectors such as Tanzania, Mozambique, Bolivia and Zambia, but in the macro sense they 
have remained fine. Uganda, Bangladesh and Ethiopia have hardly been affected for various reasons. 
 
Figure 16: 2009 real GDP growth forecasts (difference between IMF Oct 2009 forecasts and  
IMF Oct 2008 forecasts)  
 
Source: IMF data. 
 
Figure 17: Cambodia real GDP growth, 1998-2010 (projected) (annual % change) 
 
Notes: EIU = Economist Intelligence Unit. 
Source: Cambodia case study. 
 
Fast-growing economies (in 2008) also suffered the largest drop in 2009. 
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Figure 18: Countries with stronger growth rates in 2008 suffered a greater fall in 2009 
 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
For a summary of growth and sectoral effects in case study countries, see Table A3 in Annex 1. 
 
3.2 Fiscal effects 
 
Table A4 in Annex 1 provides information on what happened to fiscal positions during the crisis. A 
summary is as follows: 
 
• Receipts from import duties and VAT are in decline in many countries, which reinforces the need 
for direct tax revenues (Bangladesh, Ethiopia). 
• The crisis worsened the tax intake in Zambia, and anticipated increases in the mining tax intake 
by the government did not occur. 
• The 2009 budget in Sudan suffered a 50% reduction from the expected budget revenue 
because of the sharp decline in oil prices, from $147 to $47 a barrel. 
• On the other hand, fiscal policy was used as countercyclical policy in Bolivia and Tanzania.  
 
Box 2: Commodity dependence and budgeting (Sudan, Bolivia) 
It is important to compare budgeting practices across countries whose budgets rely on commodity prices (e.g. 
Sudan and Bolivia), with respect to the impact of the global financial crisis. Sudan had to react to falling revenues 
while Bolivia could eat into its reserves. 
 
In Sudan, the sharp decline in oil revenues meant a critical choice: to cut down current spending and/or to delay 
spending on development projects. In both cases, prioritisation of outlays became important. As a result of the 
decline in oil revenues, the 2009 budget faced enormous pressure to meet its current and development 
expenditure commitments. It concentrates on meeting critical current spending on wages and salaries and other 
strategic recurrent spending items. The first quarterly report on the 2009 budget indicated that actual oil revenues 
were only 50% of budgeted figures. As a result, actual expenditures were sharply reduced from the 2008 level, 
with a serious deviation from budgeted targets. The government had to revise spending priorities for some social 
and development projects in the face of this.  
 
Bolivia, on the other hand, has seen a significant increase in government incomes in recent years, which to a 
great extent is the result of a large increase in hydrocarbon tax revenues. The share of hydrocarbon taxes in total 
tax revenues increased from 11% in 2004 to 33% in 2008. At the same time, debt levels were kept under control. 
The continuous current account surpluses witnessed previous to the global crisis brought about an impressive 
increase in the stock of foreign exchange reserves held by the Central Bank of Bolivia, rising from $1.1 billion at 
the end of 2004 to $7.8 billion in September 2008.  
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Reserves and debt in Bolivia (US$ billions) 
 
Total public debt      Foreign exchange reserves 
  
Sources: Sudan and Bolivia case studies. 
 
3.3 Poverty and distributional effects 
 
The transmission mechanisms affect firms and households through a number of key transmission 
channels, including taxes and transfers (public and private transfers and taxation, including targeted 
transfers, subsidies, taxes, levies, remittances, etc); prices (changes in consumption and production 
prices, wages, salaries and interest rates); assets (value of and access to and/or control of assets, 
including physical, natural, human, social and financial assets); and employment (formal and informal 
employment, including self-employment and employment in household enterprises; other aspects 
include security, status, workloads and gender issues.) Investment (changed capital flows, imports and 
export opportunities) will affect fixed capital investment and access to goods and services.  
 
Loss of employment31
 
 is one feature of the global financial crisis in the case studies. For example: 
• There have been massive losses of formal jobs in Cambodian garments and construction since 
the start of the crisis, while jobs and hours of work decreased by 30-50% in hotels. There has 
been a 1-4 percentage point change in the poverty headcount over 2007-2010. At least 93 
garment and shoe factories closed permanently in the first 11 months of 2009, with reported job 
losses of at least 38,190. The temporary suspension of operations in a further 60 factories is 
also affecting 35,337 jobs. It is reported that around 102,527 jobs have been affected (either 
permanently or temporarily); this equates to around one-third of the ‘pre-crisis’ workforce. It is 
believed that a further 30,000 to 50,000 jobs in the garment industry are also at risk.  
• Poverty headcount ratios have increased by 2-3 percentage points in Kenya compared with 
what otherwise would have been the case (without the crisis). 
• In Zambia, some 10,000 workers in the mining sector lost their jobs in 2008. In DRC this was 
close to 200,000.  
• There will have been some more poverty in Bolivia in 2009 owing to declining incomes, but 
changes are expected to be small and the level of poverty is still much lower than in 2005. 
• In Bangladesh, available evidence does discuss a large number of RMG factories being shut 
down as a result of the crisis. Out of 4939 RMG factories, 270 were listed as ‘sick’ prior to the 
                                                            
31 It is possible to use the same framework as for poverty. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has estimated 
employment elasticities with respect to growth and we take the average over 1991-2003: Nigeria, 1.11; Ghana, 0.77; Zambia, 
0.20; Cambodia, 0.37; Benin, 0.87; Bangladesh, 0.31; Bolivia, 1.26; Uganda, 0.34; Kenya, 1.96; Indonesia, 0.24. 
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global recession, whereas 100 garment factories were at risk because of the adverse impact of 
global recession (survey results).32
 
 It has been estimated that at least 25,000-30,000 thousand 
RMG workers lost their jobs in the last eight months of 2009. 
Table 14 shows the expected increase in the number of poor in 2009 as a result of expected GDP 
changes resulting from the crisis, by taking changes in GDP forecasts and multiplying these by the 
number of poor people and poverty elasticity with respect to growth. 
 
Table 14: Expected poverty effects of the global financial crisis in 2009 
Country Mar 2009 
forecast for 
2009 – IMF 
Spring 2008 
GDP 
projections 
for 2009 
Poverty 
elasticity with 
respect to 
growth 
(case studies 
or literature) 
Household 
poverty 
count, 
% (latest 
year, WDI) 
Population, 
millions in 
2007 (WDI) 
Poverty increase, 
‘000s: 
change in growth 
rates *(times) 
elasticity,* 
household 
poverty count 
Bangladesh -0.2  0.38 40 158.6 482  
Bolivia -2.2  0.2 65.20 9.5 273  
Cambodia -8.6  1 35 14.4 4334  
Kenya -4.0  0.74 52 37.5 5772  
Uganda -1.1  2 37.70 30.9 2562.8  
Zambia -1.9  0.2 68 11.9 307.5  
Sources: Own calculations based in part on Phase 1 and 2 country case studies.  
 
Table A5 in Annex 1 summarises employment and poverty effects in the case study countries. 
  
                                                            
32 However, 149 RMG factories have entered the industry during this period. 
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4. Policy responses 
 
4.1 Macroeconomic policies to manage the impact of the crisis 
 
Countries have responded well in terms of short-term macroeconomic management policies (including 
monetary and banking policies and fiscal policies). By March 2009, countries in Phase 1 (including 
Kenya, Bolivia, Cambodia and Bangladesh) had already put in place macroeconomic and financial 
policies to manage the crisis: 
 
• The Central Bank of Kenya lowered the cash reserve ratio from 6% to 5% and the central bank 
rate from 9% to 8.25% in order to lower interest rates and enhance credit supply in the 
economy.  
• In Bolivia, the 2009 national budget included a 20.6% increase in public investment and a 12% 
rise in public servants’ wages and salaries 
• Cambodia had produced an expansionary budget. 
• Central Bank of Bangladesh reserves were safeguarded through withdrawal from risky 
investments and transfer to reliable central bank accounts, and private sector financial 
institutions were advised to protect their respective deposits. 
 
Table A6 in Annex 1 suggests countries undertook further actions: 
 
• Foreign exchange/reserve build-ups in DRC in April 2009; 
• Ethiopia devaluing its currency twice in 2009; 
• Lowering of the cash ratio in Kenya and a significantly expansionary budget in 2009 (6% of GDP 
deficit in FY2009/10 compared with 2% the year before); 
• A fiscal loosening in Mozambique for 2009; 
• A fiscal stimulus in Tanzania (government deficit at 1.6% for FY 2009/10) and a relaxed 
monetary policy; 
• Zambia increasing its borrowing to 3% of GDP from the planned 1.9% in 2009.  
 
The evidence suggests that the case study countries did engage in macroeconomic management after 
some initial wait-and-see instances. This is good news. 
 
4.2 Social policies to respond to the impact of the crisis 
 
While the crisis has not resulted in major social protection policy revisions, or a large-scale expansion 
of social protection provision in most countries, a number of pre-existing programmes have been 
extended and new programmes introduced, albeit on a modest scale: 
 
• Putting in place or using safety nets and cash transfers for households affected by the global 
financial crisis (or other recent crises); 
• Putting in place safety nets for households affected by the global financial crisis (or other recent 
crises); 
• Changing allocations for social sectors, such as education and health. 
 
Phase 1 studies suggested that the major types of interventions selected were food subsidies and 
rationing (Indonesia and Bangladesh); food distributions for vulnerable groups and school feeding 
programmes (Cambodia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria); in-kind transfers offering 
fertiliser (Kenya); cash transfers (Ghana); education scholarships and subsidies (Cambodia and 
Ghana); and public works programmes (Cambodia, Indonesia, Bangladesh).  
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4.3 Economy-wide and sectoral structural policies for getting the country out of 
the crisis 
 
There are limits to what can be done through short-term economic and social management, which is 
unlikely to deal with structural challenges. Growth-enhancing policies are one way to get a country out 
of the crisis. For example, a fiscal stimulus may bring spending and hence growth forward, but a 
change in business conditions might lead to faster investment, which might raise growth now and in 
the future.  
 
In our research, structural policies can include: 
 
• Trade policies (tariffs, subsidies); 
• Tax policies (e.g. corporate taxes, investment incentives); 
• Competition policies; 
• Industrial policies (e.g. export processing zones, technology and research and development); 
• Business policies; 
• Investment climate and administrative procedures; 
• Human resource policies. 
 
Such policies can be implemented economy-wide (e.g. competition policy) or at sector level (e.g. a new 
skills centre for garments).  
 
The evidence in Table A6 in Annex 1 suggests that structural growth policies were changed during the 
global financial crisis: 
  
• Apart from Sudan, which increased its duties on imported luxuries, there was no evidence that 
countries became more protectionist. 
• Tanzania reduced its tax rates (VAT from 20% to 18%; reduction in income taxes), Bangladesh 
reduced its corporation tax (from 45% to 42.5%) and VAT was raised in Sudan to make up for 
the financing shortfall.  
• Increases in budget to promote exports of tourism occurred in Tanzania. 
 
Thus, the case studies indicate that some structural policies were designed, on the whole there were 
few new policies as a result of the crisis and very few were put on hold. Again, this is good news, as 
countries kept up their pro-investment reforms.  
 
4.4 Institutional context and constraints of policymaking 
 
Some countries have better state–business relations and institutional setups to respond to crisis. The 
global financial crisis has led to the setup of crisis task forces in some countries. 
 
Several country studies (Kenya, Sudan, Zambia, DRC and Ethiopia) refer to the specific institutional 
arrangements adopted in each country as part of the policy response to the crisis. In general, these are 
coordination mechanisms to ensure communication and consultation among key government 
departments (e.g. prime minister’s offices and ministries of finance) and with other key institutions 
such as central banks. In some cases, such as Sudan and Zambia, broader consultative mechanisms or 
processes have been put in place, involving ministries and other public and private stakeholders. 
 
There are some similarities among the case studies in terms of suggestions that governments were 
initially slow to respond to the crisis (Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia) or that the initial responses were 
devised as short-term emergency measures (Zambia, Bolivia and Cambodia). Government capacity is 
part of the explanation for this, particularly in countries confronted by multiple crisis and challenges, 
like DRC. Other explanations include divergence of views within government (e.g. between the Prime 
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Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Finance in Kenya) and rent seeking that reduces fiscal space and 
financial reserves (e.g. Cambodia).  
 
A small number of papers examine the intersections between the crisis and other external or internal 
shocks such as the food crisis and internal insecurity (e.g. Kenya, DRC and Zambia). Others analyse in 
some detail the impact of the crisis in specific sectors, including some reference to sectoral governance 
issues (e.g. oil in Bolivia and Sudan; garments in Cambodia). The Cambodia report refers explicitly to 
issues of competing priorities in government spending in light of the crisis, which led to controversies 
over a proposed increase of the defence budget in 2010.  
 
Governance problems and capacity constraints are mentioned by almost all reports as challenges for 
taking forward effective policy responses to the crisis, especially in the long term. However, even when 
some analysis on these issues is provided (e.g. Bolivia, Sudan, Ethiopia) it does not appear to be taken 
into account in the detailed analysis of the sectoral policy responses.  
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5. The impact of the crisis: What have we learned? 
 
This synthesis includes a series of easy-to-read comparative tables. The key implications with regard to 
the effects of the global financial crisis on developing countries include the following: 
 
• The effects are larger and smaller than expected depending on the underlying perspective one 
takes. Compared with original suggestions that developing countries would somehow be 
shielded from the financial crisis, the effects are likely to be very large, with some 50-100 
million new poor people. But the effects on average are manageable (e.g., on the basis of 
recent IMF data and forecasts, sub-Saharan African GDP will have lost 7% by the end of 2010 
compared with forecasts pre-crisis, or some US$84 billion33
• While all countries are being affected by the financial crisis, it should immediately be added 
that the impact is highly varied, from very small or no macro effects in some countries (even 
though disaggregated effects at sector level and in some groups may be visible) to very large 
effects in others.  
), with some outliers (Cambodia and 
certain oil and mineral exporters, such as DRC, which needed external support), For individual 
countries, this is not very large compared with previous domestic shocks, although the global 
nature and scale of this shock have been unprecedented since the Great Depression in the 
1930s. 
• Financial transmission mechanisms to low-income countries initially appeared limited, and 
attention quickly focused on the real (trade and remittance) transmission mechanisms; 
however, it is now clear that bank lending, stock market contagion and worsening banking 
systems did propagate the crisis. One lesson is that some low-income countries are more 
integrated financially than is often thought.  
• Another myth expelled by the crisis is that FDI is always resilient in crises (or more resilient than 
other flows). In fact, FDI fell significantly in countries such as DRC (even before security 
problems occurred), Cambodia and Bolivia. In some other countries, such as Uganda and 
Kenya, portfolio flows changed quickly. 
• While certain types of openness have left countries more exposed to crisis, this may not always 
have meant increased vulnerability, as some countries have also become more resilient (e.g. 
Tanzania and Bolivia through good macroeconomic management, including using mineral 
resources to build up reserves). It is important that countries promote crisis-resilient growth, as 
in this way they are better prepared for recovery.  
• In particular, diversification (products and destinations) is important for growth and resilience 
to crises. This should be promoted and could draw more attention than has previously been the 
case – of course in a market-friendly way, so that policy is not completely delinked from 
policies. It is also important to diversify sources of capital flows, such as FDI inflows. For 
example, Chinese FDI is now making up for some of the losses in mining in Zambia.  
• Good macroeconomic management allows more scope for policy responses later. This requires 
good institutions in managing finances.  
• Indeed, the crisis highlights that flexible institutions are important in dealing with crises. There 
are examples of task forces that led to policy responses to the crisis in Bangladesh, Tanzania 
and Mauritius, and these were set in a more institutionalised way. 
• This global financial crisis has increased the importance of links between emerging markets 
and low-income countries. 
• Policy responses in many country case studies were well designed (even though in the previous 
phase we asked why that there had been no responses): they used fiscal, financial and 
monetary policies to address short-run economic management (fiscal policies constrained by 
resources; monetary policies lagged owing to previous inflationary pressures), and they did not 
engage in major policy reversals. In fact, so-called ‘doing business’ reforms continued.  
                                                            
33 This is based on comparing GDP outcomes and IMF forecasts made in February 2010, with IMF forecasts fo the 
period 2008-2010 made in July 2008. 
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• Protectionism did not affect the case study countries much, and trade finance was not 
mentioned as a binding constraint to trade.  
 
Below we elaborate on these issues beyond the actual findings from the case studies. 
 
5.1 Crisis-resilient growth 
 
Growth, which is crucial for development, is vulnerable to crises, with harmful long-term consequences 
for development. Vulnerability to crises increases with exposure, but declines with resilience. Exposure 
is correlated with growth, so growth involves an increase in vulnerability ceteris paribus. Shocks can 
have long-term effects on growth (as discussed by recent IMF and World Bank publications in the case 
of the global financial crisis), and therefore it is often efficient to reduce vulnerability, not by reducing 
exposure (although this might be a second best approach), as this hampers opportunities to grow, but 
by increasing resilience against crises. Thus, resilience has to increase more than growth in order to 
reduce vulnerability. We call this crisis-resilient growth. There may also be some reverse circularity in 
that countries that are doing better generally may also be better at handling crisis, with better 
institutions and better macro management. 
 
Vulnerability equals exposure minus resilience. Exposure is often measured in terms of openness to 
trade, migration and capital flows. Resilience comprises economic space (e.g. fiscal room) and 
structures, institutional capacity and social cohesion 
 
Figure 19: Key components of vulnerability (= exposure – resilience) 
Exposure Resilience
Vulnerability = 
_
Level  and distribution of capital 
flows, aid, remittances and trade 
• Economic space (national 
reserves and fiscal room to 
engage in economic and social 
management)
• Economic and social 
governance (institutional and 
policy implementation capacity, 
and social fabric)
• Political incentives
 
The country case methodology suggested that countries were exposed through financial and real 
channels. Countries with sophisticated, globalised banking sectors/stock markets or with a high share 
of foreign-owned banks and foreign assets and dependent on external capital flows (e.g. FDI, portfolio) 
were more exposed. On the real side, the most exposed countries were those  
 
• With a significant share of exports to crisis-hit advanced economies;  
• With concentrated exports in a few commodities or exporting commodities whose prices have 
dropped or products and services with high income elasticity of demand (e.g. tourism); or 
• Heavily dependent on remittances and aid. 
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But it was also clear that some countries were likely to be more resilient, especially those:  
 
• That had insured themselves against crises, e.g. countries with a current account surplus with 
few pressures on exchange rates and inflation rates, with high external reserves, low 
government deficits and healthy fiscal balances and low debts; or 
• With strong policy implementation capacity and strong institutions (e.g. effective state business 
relations) or with social protection nets. 
 
What have we learned from the global financial crisis on vulnerability, exposure and resilience and the 
promotion of crisis-resilient growth? 
 
Countries that benefitted from globalisation and that recently grew faster have also been hit harder 
(e.g. Cambodia, DRC and Kenya versus Bangladesh). Concentrated export markets are more vulnerable 
(e.g. Cambodia), while those countries diversified into regional/agriculture markets did better (e.g. 
Uganda). Exporters of ‘stockables’ (DRC/Sudan copper, oil, etc) were affected more than exporters of 
‘non-stockables’, but may also be expected to recover most (with no further de-stocking) given that 
demand and prices might recover quickly. Financially, more open countries were affected more (FDI, 
equity, bank lending), and countries dependent on remittances from developed countries or from 
informal migrants are probably affected more (Cambodia, Uganda, Bolivia compared with Bangladesh) 
than others (remittances from developing countries or formal channels).  
 
But resilient countries did better than would be suggested by their exposure rates. In some cases, this 
depends on the nature of the fiscal structure. Countries with fiscal resources dependent on extractive 
industries or trade have been affected more than countries with a more diversified source of fiscal 
revenues. Countries with sufficient reserves and low debts were able to respond counter-cyclically, with 
less need for the IMF; for example, Bolivia and Tanzania were able to take a fiscal stimulus but DRC and 
Sudan were not. The latter countries were helped by the IMF (i.e. buying in externally imposed 
resilience). Countries with political willingness, capacity and good institutions were better able to 
respond (e.g. Tanzania). Countries that actively engaged in diversification, whether of products or 
markets, were also more resilient (e.g. in Mauritius tourism fell but information and communications 
technology grew; Kenya found that intra-East African Community (EAC) trade fell less than extra-EAC 
trade).  
 
5.2 Fiscal stance 
 
Several G-20 countries experienced budget deficits of more than 10% of GDP in 2009 in implementing 
large stimulus packages. This contrasts with Ethiopia, where the IMF required the government to reduce 
its deficit from 2.7% of GDP to zero in order to qualify for a $50 million loan in February 2009 under the 
ESF. There is now a debate on the timing and level of spending cuts, although in practice it is the area 
of spending that matters. If there is a net growth effect it is worth investing economically, although in 
practice social issues will also play a role and limitations in finance will also limit investment.  
 
While the IMF has allowed more space for some governments (Kenya, Mozambique) to increase their 
deficits during the crisis, by around 2% of GDP, there had been pressure to reduce it. African countries 
need to engage in structural spending, e.g. infrastructure, so they should be able to use the space as 
long as it is sustainable to take on the debt (although this does not mean an indiscriminate approach 
to taking on debt). In several cases, deficits can lead to high debt levels and the challenge now is in 
how quickly countries can restore macroeconomic balances for them to be able to respond to the next 
crisis. 
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5.3 Promoting flexible institutions 
 
To respond to the challenges of the global financial crisis and to be able to make the right policy 
decisions, it is important to have the right institutional framework. Research suggests that only the 
most institutionalised (in the formal or informal sense) countries act in an effective way (Sen and te 
Velde, 2009) to address market and coordination failures in development. The examples of Tanzania 
and Mauritius (te Velde et al., 2010) and Bangladesh show that task forces set up to deal with the crisis 
and with sufficient high-level participation can help prepare an appropriate response. Of course, task 
forces that are not set in an institutionalised setting are not helpful, as was probably the case in DRC. 
 
5.4 Promoting diversification34
 
 
There needs to be a more active approach to openness and trade and finance diversification, not only 
because of general development concerns but also to make growth more crisis resilient and reduce 
exposure to the shock (e.g. regional exports in Uganda boosted by regional integration policy as well 
road building; information and communication technology exports in Mauritius boosted by active 
government investment; and foreign vs. local sources of lending) and promote domestic resource 
mobilisation. 
 
One important issue in promoting trade diversification is the type. It seems more difficult to change the 
sectoral specialisation of a country than its trading partners. In this context, diversifying the destination 
for exports is a strategy with a high return in times of crisis. However, two important caveats are in 
order here.  
 
First, for those countries exporting commodities, and minerals and fuel in particular, diversifying export 
markets is not a solution, as exports are to world markets and the export value in the short term 
depends on the price, which is internationally set. Obviously, in the medium to long run the export is 
also a function of supply capacity (e.g. capital invested in new oil explorations or to expand the area 
under coffee production). But even that is often ultimately driven by international prices. The crisis has 
shown once again how vulnerable mineral and oil markets can be to demand shocks. Therefore, 
countries need to build resilience to these types of shock. Not all exporters are equally able to diversify. 
For instance, the most feasible option for mineral and oil exporters is probably sectoral rather than 
market diversification. Although booming mineral export sectors are often a problem for sectoral 
diversification owing to ‘Dutch-disease’ type effects, this does not need to be the case. The example of 
Chile, where the copper booms have been accompanied by the development of successful non-
traditional export sectors, is illustrative in this respect. It underlines the importance of managing the 
response to swings in commodity prices in a careful way, extracting resources from the mineral sector 
during boom times to manage less lenient times. As noted by Calì and te Velde (2007), if enough 
windfall revenues are channelled into the public sector, there will be the option of creating a trust fund 
to save for periods of adverse terms of trade and to take some pressure off the currency (along the lines 
of the Chilean experience). This would also have the effect of not constraining the growth of other 
sectors during mineral boom times.  
 
Second, in the case of manufactured exports, a great many low-income countries (including least-
development and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries) have often been successful only via 
preferential schemes such as the ‘Everything but Arms’ initiative in the EU and the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act in the US. Exploiting this preferential market access to become more competitive 
internationally in the preference receiving sector is key to facilitating the market diversification process. 
 
                                                            
34 The recommendation of promoting trade diversification is by no means new (e.g. Hewitt and Page, 2001), although this 
crisis has reminded us about its importance once again. 
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5.5 Did exposure to emerging markets help low-income countries weather the 
effects of the global financial crisis? 
 
The country case studies show that emerging markets increasingly affect growth prospects in low-
income countries. There are direct links, such as through aid, trade, remittances and global capital 
flows, and indirect linkages through commodity prices and competition in third markets. Emerging 
markets also contribute to global public goods such as climate change and governance. 
 
Table 15 summarises information from the case studies. It shows that:  
 
• China is an important or the most important donor in Cambodia and Sudan, and is becoming 
important in Kenya. It played a key role during the crisis in these countries. At the China–Africa 
summit in November 2009, China’s Premier pledged $10 billion in new low-cost loans to Africa 
over the next three years, double the commitment made in the 2006 summit. 
• China is a key export destination for Sudan, Zambia and DRC, but it is a competitor in third 
markets for garments from Bangladesh and Cambodia. 
• China is a key investor in Cambodia, DRC, Sudan and Zambia 
• The economic situation of other BRICs countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) is also important 
for low-income countries. Brazil imports gas from Bolivia, South Africa is responsible for 
remittances to and exports from Mozambique and Russia is an emerging destination for 
Cambodian garments, Tanzanian tea and Ethiopian flowers. India has links in most countries: 
Sudan (financing deficit); Tanzania and Mozambique (cashew nuts imports) and Zambia (FDI).  
 
Strong growth in emerging markets helped low-income countries during the boom time. it is also 
helping low-income countries overcome the worst effects of the crisis. With strong growth in China and 
India, demand for and prices of copper have boosted exports from DRC and Zambia. China and India 
have helped finance (through aid and through FDI) development finance shortfalls arising out of the 
crisis. Their continued strong performance is now helping to boost other trade. On the other hand, the 
large fiscal stimuli in China for infrastructure that benefited exporters meant that cheaper garment 
exports were in direct competition with Bangladeshi and Cambodian exports. 
 
Table 15: Relation of the case study countries to large emerging countries (aid, trade, 
remittances, FDI) 
Bolivia Trade: Hydrocarbon sector grew rapidly until 2004 when export volumes of natural gas to Brazil 
reached the levels established by export contracts – then growth rates reduced; the hydrocarbon 
sector grew at annual average rate of 6.5% between 2005 and 2008. In 2009, gas exports started 
to fall (-12%) because Brazil imported less owing to lower demand as a result of the global 
financial crisis. Total export volume dropped 3.6% in the first three quarters of 2009, accounted 
for by the 25% drop in hydrocarbon export volumes.  
Cambodia Aid: Cambodia is highly aid dependent, especially for social interventions and capital 
expenditures. China, now Cambodia's top donor, increased financing, topping up its 2008 aid 
pledge of $260 million with an additional $593 million for various infrastructure projects.  
Trade: On the other hand, Cambodia is losing ground to China in the garment industry after 
safeguards imposed against Chinese garments were removed through the Agreement on Textiles 
and Clothing. Total clothing export values have fallen consistently since November 2008, 
reaching a low of -24% in April 2009. Russia, on the other hand, offers potential for market 
diversification in the garment industry.  
DRC FDI: Artisanal production and small-scale mining are the most important segments of the mining 
sector, which contributes between 70% and 80% of export earnings and 8% of GDP. Diggers, 
especially in the heterogenite artisanal mines of Katanga province, are employed mostly by 
Chinese companies,  
Trade: a big portion is exported through Zambia to South Africa, China, India and Malaysia.  
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Sudan Aid: After accumulating huge external debts of more than $34 billion in 2008, Sudan was forced 
to ask for non-concessional development aid from regional development Arab funds and from 
China and India to finance the external deficit.  
Trade: Oil exports have shifted from Sudan's traditional markets in Europe, the US and the 
Middle East to Asian countries (China, Japan, Indonesia, India, South Korea, Thailand and 
Malaysia). Asian countries' share in Sudan's exports increased from 44% in 2000 to more than 
90% in 2008.  
FDI: FDI grew at an annual average of 82.3% in 2000-2005 (mainly from China, Malaysia and 
India). FDI has been directed mainly towards the oil sector (more than 80%), with the remaining 
share going to agriculture, construction and transportation. 
Tanzania Aid: Financial houses, such as Exim Bank and Access Bank, have received special grants from 
India to help cushion the effects of the crisis by extending special credit to agriculture, value 
addition and other businesses.  
FDI: While the UK is the major source of investment in Tanzania, Kenya, South Africa and India 
also contribute. Tanzania received $695.5 million in FDI in 2008 compared with $653 million in 
2007, an increase of 6.4%.  
Trade: Price of tea (Mombasa auction) rose from $1.71 per kg in July 2007 to $2.24 per kg in July 
2009 owing to strong demand from Russia, the Middle East and Pakistan.  
Zambia FDI: Increase in FDI inflows in Zambia during the past eight years, from $121.7 million in 2000 to 
$939 in 2008. Among the main sources of FDI are China, India, South Africa and Canada. Recent 
Chinese FDI may make up for some of the employment losses resulting from mine closures 
elsewhere. 
During the third quarter of 2008, there were nine foreign-owned and four domestically owned 
banks. Between January and November 2009, three new subsidiaries of foreign banks invested in 
Zambia. Parent foreign banks come from the UK, the US, South Africa, Zimbabwe, China and 
Nigeria. Subsidiaries of foreign banks from the UK and South Africa dominate assets, loans and 
deposits.  
Trade: Copper has retained its position as the largest source of foreign exchange. Most copper, 
and its associated products, is destined for China and Europe.  
Bangladesh Trade: Bangladesh competes with China in exporting apparel items to the US. China, the largest 
exporter in the US market, sustained and even managed to improve its share in the (shrinking) 
market during the recessionary period. China’s market share increased by more than 5.0% in 
2009 (data available up to September 2009) (compared with 2007), to 43% in the third quarter of 
2009. Bangladesh's market share of apparel items also increased, although marginally, by 1.5% 
in 2009 from 2007. Against this, Bangladesh’s share in the US market has reduced to about 
4.9%, testifying to the lagged response.  
Aid: Bangladesh is currently negotiating with China for enhanced aid support.  
Mozambique Trade: The fact that 68% of Mozambican exports go to the EU (59%) and to South African (9%) 
markets, which have been severely impacted by the crisis, helps explain why exports have 
declined sharply. Other main destinations for national exports are Zimbabwe, China (mostly 
timber), Malawi (mostly tobacco) and India (mostly cashew nuts). Sectors showing remarkable 
growth in the first three quarters of 2009 compared with the same period in 2008 were water and 
electricity (9.4%), mostly because of expansion in exports of gas and electricity to South Africa, 
and construction (10.7%), mainly because of public expenditure on infrastructure and investment 
in megaprojects.  
Remittances: Inflows of workers’ remittances and employees’ compensation come mainly from 
the salaries of Mozambican migrant workers in the South African mines. These have represented 
less than 1% of GDP in the past five years. More recently, outflows of remittances related to FDI 
have increased.  
Ethiopia Trade: To enhance its reserves, the government of Ethiopia implemented a foreign currency-
denominated diaspora bond and currency swap arrangement with China. The government is 
trying to diversify the market for flowers. To offset declining sales of flowers in the Netherlands, 
its main market, the government is aiming to attract buyers from Dubai, Asia, Scandinavia, Russia 
and the US 
Kenya Aid: China is a significant provider of infrastructure assistance. Loans and grants from China 
became significant after 2002, when a new government was elected, when China’s share in total 
aid moved above 1%,  with the share increasing to 8.25% by 2005.  
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Annex 1: Text tables 
 
Table A1: The global financial crisis and aid flows – evidence at the country level 
 Recent trends in aid Aid in 2009 Was there any support from World Bank/IMF 
programmes or loans? 
Bangladesh In FY2008/09 a total amount of $1726.9 
million was disbursed. This was 
approximately $335 million (15%) less than 
the amount disbursed over the previous 
fiscal year.  
Figures for July-August FY2009/10 are also on the 
downside, indicating a decline of 90.3% in net 
foreign aid disbursement, with gross 
disbursement falling substantially from $315.2 
million in FY2008/09 (July-August) to $22.3 
million in FY2009/10 (July-August). The ADB 
earlier announced it was going to increase the 
annual assistance package to Bangladesh by 
33% to $800 million annually during FY2009/11. 
SDR allocation by IMF: On 1 September 2009, 
Bangladesh received $735 million from the G-20-
supported general allocation (total equivalent to $250 
billion to boost global liquidity). Large commitments by 
the World Bank and ADB  
Bolivia    
Cambodia $1 billion was pledged in late 2008 for 
2009. 
There has been no known cutback in total aid 
commitment. Rather, total committed aid 
increased. China topped up its aid pledge back 
in 2008 of about $260 million with an additional 
$593 million funding for various infrastructure 
projects of the government. 
 
DRC Aid level in 2008 was much higher than in 
2007 at around $1022 million. 
 DRC was one of the first two countries benefiting from 
the World Bank International Development Association 
(IDA) Financial Crisis Response Fast Track Facility. $100 
million was approved to assist the country on three 
aspects to combat the crisis: 1) $58 million reserved to 
ensure the availability of critical imported goods; 2) $16 
million to protect the functioning of essential social 
services; 3) $26 million for maintenance of basic utility 
services. The European Commission (EC) launched a 
new initiative on 8 April 2009, announcing €500 million, 
to be disbursed in budgetary support to those countries 
most hit by the crisis –DRC will be one of the recipients. 
The African Development Bank (AfDB) has set aside $95 
million similar to that of the World Bank with different 
components, assisting the country with a mix of BoP 
support for the import of essential goods and budgetary 
support to ensure essential services. 
  
Ethiopia Aid flows into Ethiopia increased steadily 
from 2007-2009. 
 
The Ethiopians are expecting a general decrease 
in aid flows. 
 
Most country assistance strategies were prepared and 
signed before the crisis and are still in force. The 
government managed to obtain $240.6 million since 
August 2009 under the high access component of the 
ESF. The government also obtained a significant 
increase in aid from the World Bank (mainly IDA) in 
2009Q2. 
Kenya The OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) database shows a 
substantial decline in foreign aid to the 
country in 2008. Kenya received only $64.1 
million in 2008 (compared with $1131.1 
million in 2007). 
 The principal source of multilateral loans has been the 
World Bank, which has pledged to fund 82 projects in 
the country in 2009. 
Mozambique  For 2010, donors have announced a reduction in 
the budget support component of aid, which will 
result in a reduction of aid coverage of the 
budget. 
The IMF has provided $176 million of support to the BoP 
under the ESF and SDR 283 million to build external 
reserves. The World Bank disbursed $110 million in 
2009, initially allocated for 2010. 
Sudan Aid increased from $47 million in 2005 to 
$52 million in 2008. 
$4.8 billion was pledged in support of 
humanitarian, recovery and development efforts 
in the whole country for the period 2008-2011. 
The funds will partly be managed by the Multi-
Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) administration under 
guidance of the World Bank (which will receive 
$650 million) and partly by the newly created 
Sudan Recovery Fund, which will be managed by 
the UN. But overall foreign aid is expected to 
decline. 
For the period 2005-2011, donor commitments were 
covered by the Oslo agreements. This will be managed 
by the World Bank. Total aid commitments (under Oslo 
1 and 2) amounted to $839.4 million (of which $246 
million – 29% – is for the north and $593.4 million – 
71% – for the south).The actual amount of these 
commitments received was $784.8 million: the north got 
$260.9 million – 33.2% - and the south $523.9 million – 
66.8%.  
Tanzania    
Uganda There has been a decline in aid to Uganda 
since 2006/07; aid declined from $426.60 
million in 2007/08 to $401.96 million in 
2008/09 (5.8%). 
There is no indication of cutbacks on assistance 
as a result of the crisis. 
 
Zambia Generally, aid flows have not been affected 
by the global financial crisis. Donor pledges 
towards both the 2009 and 2010 national 
budgets have not been revised. 
 Following the G-20 London Summit, the IMF authorised 
the provision of a one-time allocation of general SDRs to 
supplement foreign exchange reserves. A total of $628 
million was provided to government by 2009Q3. 
 
 
  
Table A2: Balance of payments in case study countries 
 Current account balance – trends 
up to Y2008 (US$m) 
Current account – Y2009 in (US$m) Exchange rate developments: effects? 
Bangladesh   Bangladesh Bank has been periodically purchasing (and 
selling) US dollars from the open market to keep the taka-
dollar exchange rate stable. Because of the weakening dollar 
against major currencies such as the euro, Japanese yen and 
Indian rupee throughout 2009, the taka remaining stable 
against the dollar implied some depreciation of the taka 
against those currencies. Between 1 January and 11 November 
2009, the taka depreciated by 6.3% against the euro, 5.4% 
against the rupee and 0.2% against the yen and appreciated 
only marginally against the dollar by 0.3%. 
Bolivia Increased exports and remittances 
witnessed in recent years caused the 
current account balance to exhibit 
continuous and increasing surpluses, 
which went up from a quarterly 
average of $84.3 million in 2004 to 
$503 million in 2008, representing a 
six-fold increase for that period.  
Starting from 2008Q4 and during 2009Q1 and 
Q2, the current account surplus dropped to $384 
million, to $160 million and to $227 million. 
During the crisis, the central bank decided to peg the exchange 
rate. The Boliviano was appreciated vis-à-vis the US dollar at 
an annual rate that in July 2008 was 9.8%. A high inflation rate 
and the nominal appreciation of the exchange rate caused the 
real exchange rate to appreciate at an annual rate which in 
February 2009 was 21.5%. In the second half of 2008 and 
during 2009, the central bank discontinued its policy of 
exchange rate appreciations and pegged the exchange rate at a 
level of Bs.7.07 per dollar.  
Cambodia  The BoP is expected to turn negative despite a 
narrower current account. 
While the riel/US dollar exchange rate also exhibited stability 
over time, with central bank interventions reversing short-term 
volatilities, there have been short periods of strengthening and 
weakening of the riel against the dollar over the period of the 
crisis, which have plausibly affected the competitiveness of 
Cambodian exports and costs of imports. In terms of real 
effective exchange rate, that of the country saw significant 
appreciation. 
DRC IMF current account figures 2007: -
$153 million, which increased to -
$1743 million in 2008. 
Projections for 2009: -$2658 million. Large government borrowing from the central bank induced a 
depletion of gross official reserves, accelerated the 
depreciation of the franc against the US dollar and led the 
inflation rate to increase. For the whole of 2008, inflation 
reached 27.6%. The gliding inflation rate, counting April 2008 
to end-March 2009, even reached 50% according to most 
recent IMF estimates. Inflation for 2009 is projected at 27%, 
identical to the inflation level reached in the first four months 
of 2009.  
  
Kenya With the crisis accompanied by 
reduced exports and a large imports 
bill (e.g. of food and oil), the current 
account deficit has widened, 
continuing an earlier trend. The 
current account deficit, for example, 
rose from $1.10 billion in 2007 to 
$2.12 billion in 2008, attributed 
mainly to the huge increase in the 
value of oil imports of $1.12 billion. 
The oil bill increased from $739 
million in 2008Q2 to $1081 million in 
2008Q3 but significantly declined to 
$540 million in 2008Q4 as a result of 
the fall in international oil prices. 
This increased imbalance in the 
context of reduced capital inflows 
has caused a depreciation of the 
shilling as well as a running down of 
foreign exchange reserves.  
The current account deficit increased further from 
$1470 million in the year to August 2008 to 
$2388 in the year to August 2009 as a result of 
reduced current transfers.  
In 2008, the shilling depreciated by 22.6% against the US 
dollar and by 15.6% since July 2008 as capital outflows 
increased. Between January and September 2009, the shilling 
appreciated by 3.1%. According to the central bank, the real 
effective exchange rate appreciated by 2.6% between June 
2008 and June 2009, reflecting higher inflation in Kenya 
relative to inflation in trading partner countries, and by 10.0% 
between June 2008 and September 2009, according to the IMF.  
Mozambique January-September 2008: -$567.3 
million. 
January-September 2009:  
-$561.1. Therefore, there was a variance of -1.1%. 
The reduction in imported inflation, resulting from the fall in 
import prices and the fuel price subsidy, opened space for the 
correction of the overvalued currency without putting strong 
pressures on inflation. Therefore, from January to September, 
the currency depreciated 10% against the US dollar and 16% in 
real effective terms while accumulated inflation until October 
was 1.4% with an expected annual rate of 3.5%.  
Sudan On the other hand, the current 
account deficit is expected to 
increase to an average of $2.9 billion 
(5.5% of GDP in 2009-2010). The 
current account balance as a 
percentage of GDP was projected by 
the AfDB before the crisis to amount 
to -6.73% in 2009 and -6.8% in 2010. 
After the crisis, projections amounted 
to -13.83% in 2009 and -15.86% in 
2010. 
 The government pegged local currency to the euro; the euro 
depreciated owing to deep recession, which led to further 
depreciation of the local currency, which in turn did not make 
Sudanese non-oil exports more competitive, because of 
incapacity and structural rigidities in the economy.  
 
  
Tanzania The current account deficit narrowed 
to $2060.7 million from a deficit of 
$2950.4 million recorded in the same 
period in 2008. 
 The value of the shilling depreciated by 12.9% by September 
2009 to an average of Tsh1308.9 from Tsh1159.5 in September 
2008. This fall was attributed to increased demand for foreign 
exchange in 2009, partly because of speculative gains and 
partly because of reduced foreign earnings relative to import 
requirements demand. However, the value of the shilling has 
been maintained within a narrow band against the US dollar in 
line with the sustained supply of foreign currency in the market 
by the Bank of Tanzania. The annual exchange rate averaged 
Tsh1317.4 per dollar in 2009 compared with an annual average 
of Tsh1195.8 in 2008, a depreciation of 10.2%. 
Uganda During 2008/09Q2, the BoP slipped 
to a deficit of $229.5 million from 
$205.92 million in the same period in 
2007/08 – largely explained by poor 
performance of the export sector. 
During 2008/09Q3, Uganda’s BoP 
registered a surplus of $193.35 
million and improved further to 
$260.41 million in Q4. Notably, the 
year-on-year Q4 BoP increased from 
$260.41 million in 2008/09 
compared with $62.37 million in the 
same period in 2007/08. 
 The shilling depreciated and reached a peak in May 2009. The 
strengthening of the shilling is noted since that time, almost 
reaching its level in October 2008. On a quarterly basis, the 
shilling weakened by 17.4% in 2008/09Q3 compared with the 
same period in FY2007/08 and it continued to weaken in Q4, 
by 24.5%.  
Zambia As a result of economic crisis, the 
BoP current account moved from a 
surplus of $85 million (2008Q2) to a 
deficit of $260 million (2009Q1) and 
$90.1 million (2009Q2) before 
moving back into surplus during 
2009Q3 following the rebound in 
copper prices. 
 There is a strong correlation between the exchange rate and 
copper prices. Between October 2008 and April 2009, the 
kwacha depreciated from K4044 to K5660 per dollar. This 
represents a monthly average of 5% and 40% depreciation 
during the period. It has appreciated steadily since May 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A3: Growth and sectoral effects 
 Growth rate 2008 Growth rate 2009 What sectors slowed down? What sectors are growing? 
Bangladesh  Depressed global economic 
situation has led to lower 
domestic investment, 
eventually leading to lower 
than projected GDP growth in 
FY2008/09 from a targeted 
6.5%: 5.9% growth was 
achieved. 
The leather industry was 
particularly affected, with its export 
figure declining by 37.6%. Exports 
of tea, agricultural products and 
frozen foods were also significantly 
affected.  
Knit and woven RMG have maintained impressive 
growth rates, alongside positive levels for chemical, 
footwear and home textiles. During FY2008/09, the 
quantum index of production of medium and large-
scale manufacturing industries registered a growth of 
7.4%. Major primary product groups recorded a 
relatively low production growth of 0.8%; however, 
higher growth of apparels meant that export-oriented 
manufacturing industry recorded a modest 10.6% 
growth during the same period.  
During FY 2009/10Q1 only export of electronics 
managed to record substantial positive growth, of 
54.8%.  
Bolivia GDP growth went up to 6.3%. 
Negative effects on growth 
had been already felt in 
2008Q4, when quarterly 
growth dropped to 4%, after 
a period in which the 
economy was growing at 
rates close to 7% i.e. during 
the first three quarters of 
that year. 
Lower growth rates 
witnessed in 2009. In 2010, 
the economy is expected to 
grow by 3.2%, a rate slightly 
lower than that expected for 
Latin America as a whole. 
Lower growth rates witnessed in 
2009 were basically the result of 
the highly negative growth rate 
exhibited by hydrocarbons  
(-13.7%), because of lower demand 
for natural gas from Brazil and 
Argentina. 
Growth is positively influenced by the significant 
recovery of the mining sector, as a result of export 
price increases occurring during 2009 in 
international markets.  
Construction was another sector that presented a 
high growth rate during 2009, owing to the boost in 
public investment and to larger investment in private 
residential construction.  
Cambodia After growing at an annual 
average of 9.3% in 1998-
2007, output growth slipped 
to an estimated 6.8% in 
2008. 
Official growth was forecast 
to be 6%. This was soon 
revised – the IMF, World 
Bank and ADB downgraded 
their 2009 growth estimates 
to -2.7%, -2.2% and -1.5%, 
respectively. 
Cambodia’s garment sector 
endured a sudden sharp 
contraction by almost 30% in 
2008Q4.  
Cambodia's tourism sector visibly 
decelerated, suspending its 
double-digit average growth of the 
past decade. In 2008, it grew at 
significantly less than the 2007 
growth of 10.3% and the decade 
average of about 13%. 2008Q4 
particularly marked the start of the 
Agriculture has been able to overcome the erratic 
growth pattern that it featured in earlier years with 
stable growth of about 5%.  
  
slowdown as year-on-year growth of 
tourist arrivals turned consistently 
negative, which carried on into 
2009Q1.  
The construction sector also 
succumbed hard to the impact of 
the crisis via the investment 
channel and to the effects of the 
bursting of the domestic real estate 
bubble. Available data suggest that 
the sector’s growth receded to 5.8% 
in 2008 from 6.7% in 2007, 
although another estimate placed 
2008 growth at only 3%. For 2009, 
a double-digit contraction in the 
sector is expected. 
DRC The projected rate of growth 
in 2008 was 10% then 
scaled down to 6%.  
Estimated rate of growth of 
real GDP at 2.7% in 2009. 
The mining sector has been forced 
to adjust by scaling down 
production, closing some 
companies and curtailing jobs.  
Sectors such as construction and 
transportation – which are linked to 
it – suffered downturn too.  
Growth was also maintained in the agriculture sector 
with a contribution to growth of 18.8%.  
Ethiopia The average growth rate in 
the period 2005/06-2007/08 
was 11%. 
For 2008/09 the government 
expected growth of 11.2%, 
while IMF and World Bank 
projections are much lower, 
at 7.5% and 6%, 
respectively.  
For 2009/10, both the IMF 
and the Bank forecast 
growth of 7%.  
The crisis is affecting the flower 
sector through a contraction in 
demand, especially from European 
countries, which are the main 
buyers, and declining prices. 
Ethiopia is expecting to earn only 
60% of a projected $280 million 
from flower exports in the year 
2008/09. 
 
 
 
 
  
Kenya In 2008, the growth rate 
declined to 2.1%. 
In 2009Q1, the growth rate 
was 4%, declining to 2.1% 
in Q2.  
The government expects 
the economy to grow at 
3.9% in 2009. AIG 
Investment, on the other 
hand, downgraded Kenya’s 
economic growth prospects 
from the 3% it had forecast 
late in 2008 to 2%.  
Other analysts predict that 
the economy will grow by 
2.5% in 2009, hindered by 
poor rains and the crisis.  
The recent performance of Kenya’s 
coffee exports, which fell (with some 
recovery in 2007 and a decline in 
2008), was partially offset by 
changes in the shilling price of 
coffee. 
 
From a major decline in 2008, the tourism sector 
experienced some recovery in 2009. According to 
some estimates, by November 2009, tourism arrivals 
and earnings were up 90% from 2008. 
Tea exports increased by 5.4% and earnings by 
36.2% in 2008. Despite a production shortfall in 
2009, earnings from tea exports increased by 17% in 
the first half of 2009 owing to increased tea prices. 
Horticultural exports increased by 4.5% and earnings 
by 24.6% in 2008. Between January and August 
2009, horticultural output declined, attributed 
mainly to a decline in flower production, which 
dropped 30% by October 2009, with exports moving 
in the same direction.  
Volume of coffee exports declined by 24.5% in 2008, 
with coffee earnings roughly unchanged. Coffee 
production peaked at 130,000mt in the 1988/89 
crop year, systematically declining since then. Less 
than 54,000mt of exports were expected in 2009.  
Mozambique 6.8% GDP growth rate in 
2008. 
While the government 
projects a 2009 annual 
growth rate of 5.8%, the 
IMF projects a 4.5% growth 
rate. Government quarterly 
data show that real GDP 
grew by 5.9%, 6.1% and 
6.5% in Q1, Q2 and Q3 of 
2009, respectively. 
Output of the manufacturing industry 
contracted slightly, by 0.1%. 
In January-September 2009, agriculture showed 
remarkable growth thanks to a good harvesting 
season, evidencing that the sector is more 
vulnerable to climate than to factors related to the 
global economic crisis. Production in this sector grew 
by 11.7% in the first three quarters, and has been the 
main driver of the overall economic growth. Industry 
has also grown, mostly because of mining, which 
grew by 6.7%.  
Other sectors showing remarkable growth in Q1-Q3 of 
2009 compared with the same period of 2008 were 
water and electricity (9.4%), mostly because of 
expansion of exports of gas and electricity to South 
Africa, and construction (10.7%).  
 
 
  
Sudan The AfDB revised its 
projections downwards and 
is expecting a GDP growth 
rate of 8.4% in 2008 and 5% 
in 2009. 
According to the Central 
Bank of Sudan, the real 
GDP growth rate is 
estimated at 4.9% in 2009 
and around 5% in 2010.  
The World Bank projected a 
GDP growth rate of 7.7% in 
2009, 7.5% in 2010 and 
5.5% in 2012. The EIU 
forecasts that real GDP 
growth will shrink to an 
average of 3.1% in 2009-
2010.  
The IMF projected a GDP 
rate of growth equal to 4% 
in 2009 and 5% in 2010.  
According to the World Bank, oil 
prices are projected to decline to 
52% in 2009 from an estimated $97 
per barrel in 2008, where the oil 
exports terms of trade will deteriorate 
by an estimated 44.8%. 
The gloomy projection extends to 
lower demand for the Sudan non-oil 
products (namely, livestock, gum 
Arabic, sesame, and other 
agricultural commodities), and the 
IMF has projected that Sudan will 
need 10 years to return to its export 
performance before 2008. 
 
Tanzania  Before the crisis, the 
economy was projected to 
increase by 8% in 2009; as 
a result of the crisis, 
economic growth was 
projected to grow at 5-6% 
for year 2009/10.  
Traditional crops faced a -0.2% 
change in growth in 2007/08- 
2008/09, minerals and gemstones -
3.9% and non-traditional goods  
-4.2%.  
Demand for Tanzanian cotton 
products also declined in the world 
market leading to a domestic market 
crisis, as international prices fell by 
40%, leading to a pile-up of unsold 
cotton stock in warehouses.  
As a consequence of reduced 
business profitability and individual 
incomes, there are already 
indications that domestic revenue 
collection in FY2009/10 will 
experience a 10% shortfall of its 4.73 
trillion shilling ($3.53 billion) target.  
The leather industry has been 
affected by the crisis: between 
September 2008 and July 2009 the 
The gold sector fared better. 
  
prices of different types of livestock 
leather declined from $1500 to $500 
per ton for salt leather and from 
$1100 to $350 per ton for ghafi 
leather.  
Additionally, the tourism industry 
generated Tsh41.6 billion in 2008, 
which is less than the anticipated 
revenue of at least Tsh49.9 billion.  
The price of diamonds was also 
affected, recording a decrease of 
26%, i.e. from $8870 per carat in 
September 2008 to $6608 per carat 
in April 2009. 
Uganda   Coffee export earnings continued to 
drop during the year, with earnings 
reaching $336.39 million down from 
$348.63 million in 2007/08 (-3.5 %).  
The regional fish trade registered a 
significant decline. Fish exports 
within the region on a year-to-year 
basis in 2008/09Q4 declined by 
37%. The corresponding figure for the 
fish trade with the rest of the world 
was 34.6%. 
The agricultural sector grew almost three-fold in 
2008/09 relative to 2007/08.  
The growth in the forestry sub-sector enabled 
agriculture to register this positive growth despite a 
sharp decline in the cash crop sub-sector from 9% in 
2007/08 to 5.6% in 2008/09.  
The food crop sub-sector registered a marginal 
increase in real growth from 2.4-2.9% in 2007/08 
and 2008/09, respectively.  
Within the industry sector, manufacturing grew from 
7.3% in 2007/08 to 9% in 2008/09. 
Zambia  The growth rate was slower 
than the projected 7% per 
annum for the Fifth 
National Development 
Plan.  
According to the Central 
Statistical Office, if copper 
prices continue to 
increase, growth could 
even increase to 6.3% 
during 2009 (and this has 
Mining: In 2009Q2 production and 
export of copper were higher than 
during the same period in 2008.The 
increased output could be explained 
by the increased copper prices, the 
reopening of closed mines and the 
opening of the Lumwana copper 
mine. This recovery has been the 
major driver of the surging recovery 
in Zambia.  
Manufacturing: The sector has been 
Agriculture: Agricultural units producing exportable 
products such as soya beans and cotton were 
adversely affected by lower export prices, but overall 
the sector performed fairly well and is expected to 
grow by 5.2% during 2009 because of good rainfall in 
the 2008/09 season. 
However, the sector is still faced with major 
infrastructural and marketing problems and, because 
of its undiversified nature, is unlikely to be a cushion 
for external shocks. 
  
now been confirmed by the 
IMF).  
adversely affected because of the 
rise of the cost of imported inputs 
owing to the depreciation of the 
kwacha. This is especially severe 
given the high import dependence of 
production in the sector.  
Tourism: The sector may decline from 
2008Q4 to 2009Q1, although it is 
variable (88,066 passengers arrived 
in 2009Q1, increasing to 102,918 in 
2009Q3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A4: Government revenue in 11 case studies 
 Has the fiscal deficit widened in the most 
recent year of data (report data) 
Has there been an increase in government 
expenditure? How much and in which 
areas? 
Has there been a decrease in tax take? Which taxes 
and how much? 
Bangladesh Bangladesh’s budget deficit has been under 
control in recent times, amounting to 3.3% of 
GDP in FY2008/09. 
In the face of the deepening impact of the 
crisis, the government had to opt for a higher 
deficit that could create some inflationary 
pressure if the budgetary expenditure targets 
are realised at the end of the fiscal year. 
With the onslaught of the crisis, the 
government attempted to go for greater 
resourced generation at domestic levels to 
reduce the expected higher deficit. 
In July-September FY2009/10, revenue earnings of the 
government from import-related duties declined  
(-2.7%) compared with the same period of FY2008/09. 
VAT at import stage recorded -8.7% growth, while import 
duties also decreased by (-2.3%).  
Supplementary duty achieved impressive 20.3% growth, 
which somewhat offset the decline from other sources. 
This was mainly thanks to the proposed new duty 
structure announced in the budget for FY2009/10.  
The crisis has reinforced the need for greater emphasis 
on direct taxes as a source for domestic revenue 
mobilisation in Bangladesh. Direct taxes account for 
only 21% of total revenue earnings (FY2008/09).  
Bolivia Government’s total revenues increased by 
57.8% in real terms between 2004 and 2008.  
During the same period, expenditures rose by 
29.2%.With the outbreak of the crisis, 
revenues tended to decrease, because of 
reduced prices of oil and natural gas which 
brought down fiscal revenues dependent on 
the hydrocarbon rent.  
During the first quarter of 2009, Bolivia 
exhibited external and fiscal surpluses of 
2.2% and 2.25% of GDP, respectively.  
The fiscal balance exhibited a surplus, 
despite a drop in fiscal revenues and an 
expansion in expenditures. 
Because of fiscal and revenue surpluses, 
government resorted to fiscal policy to 
conduct countercyclical policies, in order to 
offset the negative effects of the crisis on 
activity and employment.  
Three types of bonuses were created as a 
means of transferring resources to the 
poorest. The fiscal cost of these amounts to 
$363.9 million (2.27% of GDP) and 
comprises: 1) Renta Dignidad, a transfer to 
elderly people totalling $267.2 million (1.7% 
of GDP); 2) Bono Juancito Pinto, a transfer to 
school children totalling $27.7 million (0.2% 
of GDP); and 3) Bono Juana Azurduy, a 
transfer to pregnant women totalling $69 
million (0.22% of GDP). 
The share of hydrocarbon taxes in total tax revenues 
increased from 10.8% in 2004 to 32.5% in 2008.  
However, since the outbreak of the crisis, there has 
been a reduction in hydrocarbon export revenues and 
the fiscal balance surplus has tended to reduce. 
 
 
  
DRC The widening of the current account deficit to 
about 11% of GDP, which stemmed from the 
slowdown in exports, was countered by the 
almost 80% increase in FDI inflows and 
expansion of the net foreign assets of 
commercial banks.  
Falling export prices in late 2008 contributed, 
together with a surge in public spending to 
tackle the escalating conflict in the Kivu 
region, to weakening macroeconomic 
performance.  
Thus, the higher spending and the slowdown 
in export revenue resulted in large 
government borrowing from the central bank.  
The crisis reduced revenues, mainly those 
from mining and from oil producers, but most 
importantly security and humanitarian 
problems in the east of the country put an 
enormous pressure on the expenditure side.  
These evolutions led to fiscal deficits starting 
from September onwards, with a gap of $134 
million over the last months of 2008. 
 
Ethiopia Government revenue fell from 16.1% of GDP in 
2003/04 to 12.7% of GDP in 2006/07 to 
12.2% of GDP in 2008/09.  
Government expenditures fell from 23.7% in 
2003/04 to 17.6% in 2008/09. 
Given that, in the past three years poverty-
targeted expenditures accounted about 63% 
of total government expenditure, it is likely 
that any adverse effect of the financial crisis 
on government expenditure will have a 
serious implication on poverty.  
The crisis is likely to have adversely affected 
government revenues through a reduction in import 
duties and taxes, which represented: 56% of tax 
revenues and 40% of total revenue in 2007/08, and in 
income taxes as well. 
Mozambique No, as fiscal revenues grew at 9.5% (15.1% in 
2008). 
 No, VAT was collected from internal operations, being its 
single most important component, growing at 15.3% 
(9.4% in 2008).  
The biggest reduction in the growth rate was registered 
on the VAT from external operations, which grew by 
0.6% (21.2% in 2008). 
 
 
 
  
Sudan Central government's budget depends strictly 
on oil revenues, which in 2007 represented 
about 64% of total revenues.  
The crisis caused an enormous reduction in 
budget revenue (50%) because of the sharp 
decline in oil prices from $147 to $47 a barrel. 
The result was variability of 20-35% in the 
spending of various government units. This 
led to a widening of the fiscal deficit. 
The World Bank predicts that the ratio of 
government revenues to GDP will decline 
from: 22.8% in 2008 to 20% in 2010 and  
18% in 2012. 
The IMF has also provided some even lower 
projections for the revenues and similar 
projections for expenditures as a percent of 
GDP in 2010.  
The revenue ratio to GDP will drop to 16% by 
the end of 2009 and is projected to decline to 
16.6% in 2010, whereas expenditures are 
projected to decline to 19.8% in 2010. 
Also, expenditures will decline from 23% in 
2008 to 19.3% in 2009 and reach even lower 
levels in 2010.  
There was an increase in tax take: expected impacts on 
stock and financial markets were very low owing to the 
lack of direct links to international markets and absence 
of foreign investors in the Sudanese market.  
The Government of National Unity responded to the 
decline in oil revenues by swiftly increasing VAT, from 
10% to 15% in 2007 and to 20% on telecommunications 
in 2008, also introducing a development tax of 5% and 
scaling up customs duties on imported cars and 
luxuries.  
Tanzania Not really: government registered a shortfall 
of about Tsh151 billion against its revenue 
projection.  
The shortfall is attributed to indirect taxes 
and international trade revenue, in particular 
import duty, petroleum duty.  
Domestic revenue performed poorly 
compared with international revenues in 
2008/09 relative to 2007/08 – largely from 
low domestic demand especially for beers, 
cement and airtime.  
Towards the end of 2008/09Q4, the trend 
seems to have reversed, with domestic 
revenues increasing by on a year-to-year 
 Tax revenue collection during the first three quarters of 
2009 was 11.4% of GDP compared with 10.8% of GDP 
during the corresponding period in 2008.  
Total revenue collection was 91.5% of budget 
projections.  
Good performance was recorded in taxes of local goods 
whereby revenue collection was 21.6% higher compared 
with the corresponding period of FY2007/08.  
  
basis by 44% in nominal terms. PAYE 
increased by 45.9% and 36.3% for indirect 
taxes in the same period.  
Government continued to reform the tax 
system to modernise, broaden and enhance 
domestic revenue collection, even though its 
expenditure in 2008/09 was below budget 
estimates.  
Recurrent expenditure was 94.6% of 
estimates and development expenditure was 
74.5%.  
Total government expenditure during 
2008/09 was 17.3% of GDP, out of which 
recurrent expenditure was 11.7% of GDP. 
Zambia The crisis compounded the fact that overall 
tax revenue has been declining relative to 
GDP in recent years. 
This averaged around 18% between 2005 and 
2007. It dropped to 15.6 % in 2009 and is 
likely to remain at that level during 2010. 
The mines have continued to contribute little 
revenue, and corporate income tax and tariff 
revenues have declined because of the crisis.  
Government has been unable to proceed with 
planned increases in public expenditure 
because the anticipated substantial increase 
in mining tax evaporated following the crisis. 
The upsurge in copper prices in 2009 put in 
question the government’s hasty decision to 
remove the windfall tax. 
Government attempts to reform the mining tax regime 
were undermined by fears of further mining job losses 
following falling copper prices in 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A5: Employment and poverty effects 
 
 
Employment effects Poverty effects Other (e.g. rural–urban, gender) 
Bangladesh The resilience of the economy during FY2008/09 
contributed towards containing the adverse 
impacts on the employment situation. Relatively 
high growth of agriculture had a positive impact 
from the labour absorption perspective. Growth 
of employment opportunities in industry is 
expected to slow down; only 0.4 million job 
opportunities were expected to be created in 
FY2008/09. According to the projection, 
unemployment will increase marginally to 3.7% 
in FY2009/10. The declining trend in 
underemployment visible since 2002-2003 
would possibly slow down in FY2009/10. This 
indicates that global recession may not impose 
rapid job cuts, as experienced by many 
developed countries, but would entail adverse 
implications for labour market composition in 
Bangladesh.  
Poverty continued to decline between 2005 and 
2007, in keeping with past trends, with a reversal 
of the trend in 2008 because of the subsequent 
commodity price hike, particularly of rice. 
According to World Bank estimates, the 
proportion of people living below the poverty 
line, which was expected to drop from 40% to 
32% between 2005 and 2008, was likely to be 
about 38%. 
Agriculture attained an impressive 4.6% growth 
during this period. With the majority of the 
population making their livelihoods from 
agriculture, poverty impacts during the crisis period 
could thus be limited. However, the slowdown in 
economic growth, declining exports and sluggish 
investment in more recent times could lead to a 
reduced pace of poverty reduction in 2010. 
Bolivia The rate of unemployment in 2007 reached 7.7% 
of the labour force. The fall in metal export prices 
witnessed at the end of 2008 caused a drop in 
activity and employment in the mining sector, 
but this trend tended to reverse in 2009, and 
activity growth and employment tended to 
recover.  
In 2007, poverty incidence was as high as 60.1% 
and extreme poverty incidence was 37.7%. The 
fall in remittances was limited. Although 
household incomes reduced in 2009 because of 
the crisis, levels are considerably higher than 
income levels in 2005, prior to the export boom.  
  
Cambodia The continued slowdown in the garment sector 
reportedly led to the permanent shutdown of at 
least 93 garment and shoe factories in the first 11 
months of 2009. This in turn has led to job 
losses of at least 38,190. It is estimated that 
about 25,000 construction workers had lost their 
jobs as of April 2009. Meanwhile, the tourist 
workforce is estimated to have contracted by 
2.3% in 2009. Reported results of a survey of 72 
hotels indicate that 30% to 50% of jobs had 
been shed at 12 hotels, with working hours 
 An additional one to four percentage points in 
the poverty headcount between 2007 and 2010 
is expected. The poverty rate will decline from 
about 45% in 1994 to about 30% in 2007. 8 of 
the 10 surveyed worker categories have 
experienced a significant fall in real daily 
earnings, although declines have occurred 
during different periods. 
Between May and August 2009, the debt burden 
resulting from deterioration in incomes, exhaustion 
of savings and other factors seemed to have been 
exacerbated. Not only has the crisis caused sharp 
declines in remittance transfers to rural 
households, it has also set off ‘reverse 
remittances’, or remittances sent from rural 
households to members working in the cities, 
particularly in garment factories. 
 
There has been a general reduction in job 
  
decreasing also by 30% to 50% at the remaining 
surveyed hotels. 
availability in both urban and rural areas (of 
approximately 30-40% over the past six months as 
per the May 2009 survey). This trend has been 
more pronounced in the garment, construction and 
rural rice farming sectors. 
DRC Things looked much worse with the outbreak of 
the global crisis, since not all laid-off informal 
workers in the mining sector have had a chance 
to compensate elsewhere for the loss of the 
nominal wage of $100. 
Looking at price changes of the items that enter 
in the Consumer Price Index calculation might 
give some idea on the proportion to which 
different groups of actors adjust the price of 
goods or services they offer. In inflationary 
situations, the losers are those who cannot 
protect their purchasing power, for example by 
the indexation of nominal wages and salaries or 
by holding foreign currency, which is a widely 
spread practice in DRC. Someone enjoying a pay 
of $100 would have lost 85.2% of his or her 
purchasing power between January and 
September 2009, given historical exchange rate 
depreciation and inflation.  
Together, the surge in security spending and the 
steep drop in export earnings have weakened the 
fiscal position of the government – thus paving the 
way for exchange rate depreciation and inflation.  
Ethiopia   Pre-crisis, the magnitude of poverty elasticity 
with respect to growth reached -1.7 in 2005, from 
-1.3 in 2000. The Poverty Headcount Index 
declined to 38.7% in 2005 from 45.5% in 1996. 
The Poverty Gap Index declined to 8.3% in 2005 
from 12.9% in 1996. The Poverty Severity Index 
also declined to 2.7% in 2005 from 5.1% in 1996.  
The crisis has led to an increase in the number of 
people in poverty of 634,000, people who 
otherwise would have exited poverty.  
It has been observed that remittance inflows to 
Ethiopia dipped immediately after the crisis hit. 
This decline, in addition to its effect on the 
economy through foreign exchange availability, has 
a direct and severe adverse impact on households 
that depend on remittances for their regular 
household expenses. The study found that 
remittances cushion urban households from ever-
deepening poverty and vulnerability to recurrent 
shocks and help vulnerable households to smooth 
their consumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Kenya 7 million Kenyan adults are engaged in pastoral, 
non-commercial agricultural pursuits. A further 
9.5 million are employed or in self-employment. 
Of these, 9.5 million in employment, 1.9 million 
are engaged in the informal sector and about 0.5 
million are employed by the public sector (in 
teaching, civil service and parastatals). While the 
crisis itself may not have any effects, the other 
problems that have affected Kenya in the past 
two years are likely to affect those employed 
outside the informal and public sectors, in 
commercial agriculture, manufacturing and 
tourism, who interact directly with the global 
financial system. 
The impact of reduced growth is to increase the 
headcount poverty ratio, which had reduced from 
56% in 2000 to 46% in 2006 by 2% to 3%, this in 
turn affecting other human indicators.  
Child mortality, primary school enrolments and life 
expectancy, for instance, rise during growth 
reductions but barely fall during accelerations, 
although there is no evidence yet that this has 
happened in Kenya.  
Sudan Some reports estimate that unemployment was 
at 18.7% in 2002, with the population below the 
poverty line at 40%. The total labour force was 
estimated at 11.92 million, with the labour force 
in agriculture at around 80%, industry 7% and 
services 13%. 
For the whole of Sudan, poverty incidence 
increased from 51.6% in 1968 to 91.1% in 1993. 
As a result of the crisis, the Government of 
Southern Sudan (which in its budget was 98% 
dependent on oil revenues) ordered a 10% salary 
cut for senior officials and a clampdown on hotel 
costs of officials without their own house. This 
caused serious political tensions among salaried 
workers (who constitute more than 80% of current 
spending) and fostered insecurity and social and 
tribal conflicts. 
Tanzania The information available indicates that a 
number of sectors have been negatively affected. 
These include mining, agriculture and tourism. 
Following the crisis, some multinational 
companies decided either to close their 
businesses operations or to scale down their 
business investments.  
The fall in investment, loss of jobs, reduction in 
demand for agricultural products and minerals 
and decline in international tourist arrivals will 
worsen the country’s poverty status. One can 
extrapolate the impact from loss of export 
revenue, leading to reduced profitability, job 
cuts, reduced purchasing power and lack of 
ability of individuals to cater for their basic 
needs.  
The financial crisis also affected decisions to 
review the minimum wage, such that a proposal by 
the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania to set a $315 
minimum wage was considered untenable by other 
stakeholders. The crisis also made it hard for the 
Tanzanian government to increase salaries for 
public servants in 2009/10 as in past years. 
 
 
  
 
Uganda   In an impact evaluation of the Northern Uganda 
Social Action Fund, strong growth in agriculture 
as a result of a return to peace in the region was 
seen as greatly contributing towards a significant 
reduction in income poverty. It is using this 
evidence that one would conjecture a reduction 
in poverty.  
No major budget cuts are evident in the social 
sectors and tax has remained unchanged.  
Zambia The poverty situation is exacerbated by a lack of 
effective social protection in the country. Just 
before the crisis, the government started to 
devise a social protection system for the country. 
The global financial crisis had almost stalled this 
but progress is now apparent. 
Despite increased growth in the pre-crisis period, 
poverty remains a major concern in Zambia. The 
situation did not improve during 2009. The 
slowdown in the growth rate and accompanying 
fiscal effects reduced government expenditure 
on the social sectors and poverty reduction 
programmes.  
The crisis is more likely to affect urban and peri-
urban populations than rural households. This is 
because rural households depend more on 
agriculture for their livelihoods, with little 
connection to global markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A6: Policy responses to the crisis 
 Macroeconomic Social Structural 
Bangladesh Bangladesh Bank withdrew about 90% of its 
total investment from international banks 
perceived to be at risk.  
Bangladesh has pursued a policy of keeping the 
exchange rate stable vis-à-vis the US dollar even 
during the crisis. 
The government eventually came up with an 
Annual Development Plan (ADP). The total size of 
the ADP for FY2009/10 has been fixed at 
Tk30,500 crore ($4.4 billion), which would be 
over 55% higher than the implemented ADP of 
FY2008/09.  
In the first stimulus package, Tk1500 crore ($21.4 
million) was allocated for agriculture, Tk600 
crore ($8.6 million) for the power sector, Tk500 
crore ($7.1 million) for re-capitalisation of 
agriculture loans and Tk374 crore ($5.3 million) 
for social safety net programmes. The first 
stimulus package also put more money into the 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) Fund, 
whose capital was raised from Tk 500 crore 
($71.4 million) to Tk600 crore ($85.7 million).  
The second package has a provision of Tk5000 
crore ($714.3 million) for the budget in 
FY2009/10.  
The third package is dedicated solely to the 
apparel sector.  
Social safety net programmes: The government 
has created three funds with the seed money of 
Tk1000 crore ($144.8 million) to provide 
refinancing facilities to SMEs against loans 
disbursed by commercial banks and financial 
institutions. At least 15% of this was earmarked for 
women entrepreneurs at interest of 10%. 
The allocation for social empowerment was also 
increased from Tk2484.0 crore ($359 million) to 
Tk3007 crore ($435 million), which was 2.64% of 
the total budget and 0.44% of GDP.  
The two employment creation programmes 
(Employment Generation for the Hardcore Poor and 
National Service Programme) were also created as 
part of safety net programmes. 
In the budget for FY2009/10 the corporate tax rate 
for financial institutions were brought down to 
42.5% from 45%. It is estimated that, in doing so, 
the government will incur a revenue loss of about 
Tk550 crore ($78.6 million) in the current fiscal 
year.  
A number of tax measures were also taken for the 
cottage industries. The cottage industries are 
currently exempted from VAT and instead are 
required to pay a turnover tax at a rate of 4%, 
which has a positive impact on cost of 
production. In the budget for FY2009/10, 
eligibility for exemption from VAT for cottage 
industries has been widened by covering 
relatively larger cottage units.  
 
 
 
Bolivia During the first 11 months, deposits in the 
financial system increased by 20.5%. On the 
other hand, lending by the financial system went 
up, but by only 6.2%. As a result, financial 
entities accumulated large liquidity reserves.  
Public external debt, which had been 
significantly reduced in previous years as a result 
The government created various bonuses that 
were transferred to the population, as a means of 
boosting private consumption and thus aggregate 
demand.  
However, the government has not taken policies 
aimed at creating jobs that are sustainable in the 
 
  
of various debt relief initiatives, grew despite the 
continuous fiscal balance.  
Finally, inflation has been brought down, with 
year-on-year inflation in Nov at only 0.6%. 
Activity slowed and the rate of growth of GDP in 
the first half of 2009 was 3.2%  
long term. 
Among such job-creating policies are creation of a 
more favourable investment climate, which will 
promote private investment, and a focus on 
labour-intensive export products and the opening 
up of larger foreign markets for labour-intensive 
manufacturing exports.  
Cambodia The central bank slashed the reserve 
requirement from 16% to 12% to help inject more 
liquidity into the system as well as: removing the 
cap on real estate lending to stem the effects of 
the bubble burst; creating an overdraft facility 
(though backed by a limited amount) to help 
solvent banks struggling with temporary liquidity 
shortages; issuing a tougher regulation on asset 
classification and provisioning to diagnose more 
accurately the NPL situation and ensure banks 
are in a better position to cover potential losses; 
toughening regulation on reporting of major 
exposures to better assess credit risk 
concentration; and strengthening regular and 
targeted, off- and on-site surveillance.  
To accommodate greater spending, the budget 
deficit was allowed to expand to the target 4.3% 
or so of GDP in 2009. It is projected that the 
government will overshoot this target by about 
2.4 percentage points by end this year.  
Short-term remedial measures implemented by 
the government to sustain its attractiveness to 
FDI to the extent feasible came in the form of tax 
breaks in the garment and agriculture sectors or 
eased travel for the benefit of the tourism 
industry. 
There has been a lack of intensification of social 
safety net provision over the period of the crisis.  
Several measures were implemented by the 
government to harness the performance of the 
sector over the period of the crisis: the 
establishment of the Agriculture Support and 
Development Fund and the granting of a three-
year tax holiday for agricultural investment 
projects as well as of zero tariffs on importing 
agricultural materials.  
 
  
 
 
  
 
DRC In March 2009, the government initiated a rescue 
plan to tackle the effects of the crisis on the 
national economy. Its resource envelope is 
estimated at $695.0 million, with $325.0 million 
for actions in the short run.  
Faced by the crisis, the 2009 budget was revised. 
The budget, based on a macroeconomic 
framework of a 5.8% growth rate and an exchange 
rate of FCFA585 per dollar anticipated revenues of 
FCFA2.9 billion.  
In the execution of its budget, the government, in 
agreement with the IMF, focuses on a number of 
key short-term measures to maintain a fiscal 
equilibrium and economic stability: 1) the budget 
should be executed on cash basis, targeting zero 
government borrowing from the central bank, to 
avoid exchange rate depreciation and inflation 
spirals; 2) spending should be redirected to 
activities that would prop up domestic demand.  
After receiving the exceptional ESF BoP support 
from the IMF, the central bank announced on 13 
April 2009 that it would again start selling foreign 
exchange, hoping to make the local currency 
recover some of its lost value. The bank also 
increased its policy rate in three steps to absorb 
the excess liquidity. 
The sale of treasury bills is a final intervention 
used by the central bank.  
By 2010, the government envisages the 
formulation of a new poverty reduction strategy 
paper (PRSP). To avoid the limited alignment of the 
first PRSP to the annual budget of government, the 
new strategy should be more prioritised and be 
clearly linked to Medium-Term Expenditure 
Frameworks (MTEFs) that are annually translated 
into budgets.  
To accelerate growth, most interviewees agreed 
the focus of the new strategy should be on large-
scale investment in the agriculture sector and an 
improvement of the overall business environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Ethiopia Initial wait-and-see strategy. But, since July 2007, 
the national bank has shifted its policy from 
monetary easing to monetary tightening.  
On the financial side, the regulation of banking, 
insurance and microfinance businesses was 
strengthened. The bank reduced exposures in the 
international financial market by collecting and 
transferring maturing funds available in commercial 
banks to central banks such as Federal Reserve, 
Bank of England and Deutsche Bundesbank.  
On the fiscal side, the objective was to maintain the 
budget deficit at a sustainable level through 
enhanced revenue collection and reduction of lower 
priority expenditure. Accordingly, the government 
decided not to borrow domestically from the 
banking system on a net basis in 2008/09 
compared with domestic borrowing of 2.7% of GDP 
in 2007/08. Expenditure for priority sectors such as 
health, education and infrastructure recorded a 
24.3% increase, while non-priority expenditure 
showed growth of 15.6%. Moreover, the government 
committed to closely follow the activities of public 
enterprises and reduce their domestic borrowing to 
4-8 billion birr (no more than 2.5% of GDP) in 
2008/09. Finally, the outreach of the VAT system 
was expanded to cover more traders and sectors, 
and an effort was made to collect long overdue tax 
arrears in 2008/09.  
To achieve greater exchange rate flexibility, the birr 
was depreciated by 10% vis-à-vis the US dollar on 13 
January 2009, and by end-June had depreciated by 
some 16% since September 2008. The government 
also tried to crack down parallel foreign exchange 
market operators. Reserves were aimed to be 
increased to $1.6 billion (8-10 weeks of imports of 
goods and non-factor services) through limited 
foreign exchange sales by the bank in the inter-bank 
foreign exchange market and by putting in place 
Measures have been taken to minimise the 
adverse household effects of domestically 
generated inflationary pressure but there are 
no specific social measures taken to respond 
to the crisis. 
The government has extended the loan 
repayment schedule for 42 flower producer 
exporters to two-three years to enable them 
to cope with sluggish demand in the flower 
market. Moreover, it is trying to diversify the 
market for flowers by attracting buyers from 
Dubai, Asia, Scandinavia, Russia and the US.  
To overcome ongoing food security and 
foreign exchange shortage problems, the 
government is taking supply-enhancing 
policies and reforming the product market 
into an organised form. It is inviting FDI in the 
agricultural sector, and has established 
Africa’s first commodity exchange to enhance 
market-oriented agriculture in the economy.  
It has also taken a firm stand not to affect the 
deposit interest rate further despite pressures 
from professionals at home and abroad. 
 
  
foreign exchange rationing practices. Moreover, the 
government has implemented a foreign currency-
denominated diaspora bond and currency swap 
arrangement with China, and there is still the 
possibility to enhance currency swap arrangements 
with China, Japan and Italy.  
Kenya In the 2009/10 fiscal year, the government adopted 
an expansionary fiscal stance. A budget deficit of 
KSh109 billion (about 6% of GDP) is envisaged, with 
concerns that heavy borrowing will crowd out 
lending to the private sector. According to the 
central bank, the KSh109 billion that the 
government intended to raise from the domestic 
market would not hurt the economy.  
Among some of the monetary policies implemented, 
the bank lowered the cash ratio from 6% to 5% and 
the central bank rate from 9% to 8.25% in order to 
lower interest rates and enhance credit supply in the 
economy, although some observers contended that 
these actions were not enough to significantly 
achieve these objectives. 
On 22 July 2009, the cash ratio was further reduced 
from 5% to 4.5%, releasing about KSh5 billion for 
banks to lend; while the central bank rate was 
reduced from 8% to 7.75% and further to 7% in 
November 2009.  
In October 2009, the government successfully 
issued a 12-year KSh18.5 billion bond at a rate of 
return of 14.5% to finance projects in energy, roads, 
water and sewerage. The issue was oversubscribed 
by 45% attracting a total of KSh27 billion against a 
target of KSh18.5 billion.  
In order to encourage investment in long-term 
treasury bonds and promote the development of the 
bond market, the government in the 2009/10 
budget reduced the withholding tax charged on 
interest income earned from long-term bonds from 
To enhance the recovery, the Ministry of 
Tourism has called on the treasury to give it 
5% of what the tourism sector generated in 
2007 for its promotion and marketing. The 
government had already reduced visa 
charges from $50 to $25 and waived visa fees 
for children.  
The government initiated the KSh15 billion 
Kazi Kwa Vijana programme in March 2009. 
This is dove-tailed into the Economic 
Stimulus Programme and aims to create 
300,000 jobs for youth by December 2009.  
The Ministry of Gender, Children and Social 
Development announced that people aged 
over 65 not on any pension would be paid a 
monthly stipend of KSh1000 from the state. 
The ministry would cater for payments from 
its budget and was only waiting for district 
commissioners to provide the number of 
beneficiaries, estimated at 1.026 million, 
about 2.5% of the population. 
 A social welfare programme involving cash 
transfer to targeted orphans and vulnerable 
children was also set to be strengthened in 
some 50 districts. The Cash Transfer 
Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable 
Children, which had been running on a pilot 
basis, was then disbursing payments to 
households with orphans and vulnerable 
children through the Postal Corporation of 
Kenya. 
. 
  
15% to 10%. The central bank was to implement this 
policy from 12 June 2009, subject to the condition 
that the bonds are not issued for infrastructure 
financing (already exempt from tax) and the tenor of 
the bonds is 10 years and above.  
To increase confidence in the stock market, the 
authorities have increased the minimum capital 
requirements for stockbrokers from KSh5 to KSh50 
million and for investment banks from KSh50 to 
KSh250 million effective from December 2010. 
 
The budget for core poverty programmes has 
expanded significantly over time. In nominal 
terms, only KSh20.3 million or 7.6% of actual 
expenditure was approved in 2000/1. About 
KSh78 billion or 16% of total expenditure was 
approved for these programmes in 2007/08, 
although only 67% had been spent or 
committed by September 2008. In 2008/09, 
this component of the budget was reduced to 
KSh62.9 billion.  
Mozambique Fiscal policy in 2009 was loosened for a higher 
primary deficit. Bank borrowing was allowed to 
increase but this was barely used because the World 
Bank advanced a disbursement of $110 million and 
the reduction in government revenues was smaller 
than initially expected. 
Government also cut expenditures in non-priority 
areas, although that in the Office of the President 
and on defence and security increased. 
In the financial sector, the central bank is pressing 
ahead to strengthen its monetary policy instruments 
and operations, with a view to possible moving 
away from reserve money targeting towards inflation 
targeting in the medium term. Strengthening 
financial intermediation and banking sector 
supervision are key. To this end, supported by 
technical assistance, the bank will finalise an action 
plan to implement the recommendations of the 
2009 Financial Sector Assessment Programme 
Update and develop a financial sector contingency 
plan.  
 
  
Government social interventions related to 
the crisis were mostly confined to preventing 
a higher level of redundancies in the 
workforce. For example, government 
negotiated with some companies to limit the 
number of workers made redundant.  
At the fiscal level, the government is implementing 
reforms in revenue administration and public 
financial management to shore up the 
government´s medium-term fiscal strategy and to 
mitigate fiscal risks.  
The government, in consultation with the World 
Bank, has identified specific measures that it 
intends to put on a fast track and implement by 
end- 2010. 
This aims to improve the business environment, 
raise growth potential, diversify exports and 
stimulate new investment. 
A key priority is to improve public management of 
natural resources, with a view to increasing the 
benefits spilling over to the domestic economy, 
strengthening transparency and limiting budgetary 
liabilities. The government sees full membership in 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative as 
critical for these objectives. Following its 
acceptance as an EITI candidate country in May 
2009, the creation of an EITI Secretariat will help 
carry reform forward.  
 
  
Sudan To deal with the sharp decline in oil revenues, VAT 
was raised from 10% to 15% in 2007 and to 20% on 
telecommunications in 2008, a development tax of 
5% was introduced and customs on imported new 
cars and other imported luxuries were substantially 
scaled up.  
Internal borrowing through the sales of more 
Musharaka Certificates was also expanded, and 
deficit financing was used to meet spending needs.  
Faced with sharp decline in foreign currency reserves, 
the Central Bank of Sudan imposed tough restriction 
on transfer of foreign currency abroad through banks 
and/or via foreign currency exchange bureaus (the 
maximum amount for external transfer is $1400 per 
person per day). The bank also set a limit on the 
amount of foreign currency allowed for travel abroad 
purposes.  
The banking system has been reformed since 2008 by 
improving banking supervision, restructuring and 
raising banks capital, and dealing with the problem of 
a high NPL ratio.  
The Ministry of Finance and National Economy formed 
a joint technical committee with representatives from 
the central bank, with the aim of examining any 
possible effects of the crisis on the economy and 
advising the government with possible policy options 
to mitigate the effects. It has been stated that a new 
monetary, credit and economic policies need to be 
adopted in 2010 with the objectives, among others, to 
diversify exports and stop depending on single 
exportable commodity (oil); remove barriers to 
investment and simplify administrative and 
procedural requirements to inventors; remove any 
contradiction in policies and procedures between 
federal and state laws regarding foreign investment; 
and to reform and strengthen the financial sector. 
In order to achieve food security, 
encouraging private investments in 
agriculture and the launching of a 
productive agricultural development plan, 
within the context of an overall 
development of agri-business value chain 
strategy, will be the real challenge in the 
long run for the country. 
 
 
  
Tanzania Inflation has been accelerating since 2006 and 
averaged 11.3% in 2009. As a result, the Bank of 
Tanzania revised its medium-term inflation objective 
upward in 2008 from 5% to 7%.  
The government set aside Tsh1.7 trillion (about $1.3 
billion) as an economic stimulus package, among 
which over Tsh200 billion ($152.67 million) was set 
aside to aid local banks in separate programmes from 
credit financing to traders, cooperative societies and 
large-scale farmers who were falling behind on loan 
payments during FY2009/10. Although the country 
will get an additional $220 million as part of the fiscal 
stimulus package from the G-20 to fight off the world 
economic crisis, the amount, which was injected into 
the 2009/10 national budget, was equivalent to 1% of 
the country’s GDP. 
Parts of the package:  
Fiscal space: To fill the gap in revenue caused by the 
crisis, the government accommodated in the budget 
for FY2009/10 net domestic financing, equivalent to 
1.2% of GDP in 2008/9 and 1.6% of GDP in 2009/10. 
Reduce the tax rate: Such as the VAT rate from 20% to 
18% and income tax of selected categories from 30% 
to 25%.  
An accommodating monetary policy: The bank has 
relaxed its monetary policy stance beginning 
2008/09Q4 to facilitate bank financing of the privates 
sector.  
Reduced the penal rate for central bank standby 
facilities (the lombard facility and the discount rate): 
To allow easy and cheaper access by the banks to 
resources from the central bank. 
Bridging the foreign exchange gap: A loan amounting 
to $36 million from the IMF under the ESF to fill the 
gap in the BoP caused by the decline in exports was 
approved by the IMF Board. 
Improving food distribution to curb food 
shortages: government has provided a 
cushion against the impact by allocating 
Tsh20 billion in the FY2009/10 budget to 
ensure food availability at a reasonable 
cost. The funds were provided in the 
October 2009 expenditure ceiling and will 
be used to purchase maize. 
Social programmes before the crisis: 
Needless to say, the government has 
maintained its commitment to continue 
supporting special social schemes through 
programmes under the Presidential Trust 
Fund, the Tanzania Social Action Fund, the 
special presidential development fund 
(known as Mabilioni ya Kikwete) and 
agricultural input subsidy funds for fertiliser 
seeds and farm implements. 
The government responded by working closely with 
the Tanzania Tourist Board and the private sector in 
promoting Tanzania as a tourist destination. This 
included marketing all the tourist attraction in 
overseas media and urging industrial operators to 
improve their services and promote domestic 
tourism.  
  
Uganda The country has not changed its policy on 
determination of exchange rates, which have been 
market determined since liberalisation of the foreign 
exchange market in 1993; the central bank intervenes 
in the foreign exchange market only to smooth 
perceived short-run exchange rate fluctuations.  
The fiscal authorities are expected to achieve that 
objective through budgetary measures (revenue, 
expenditure and financing measures). During the 
crisis period, the country maintained its target on the 
fiscal deficit – to reduce the deficit to below 5% of 
GDP. Broadly, like monetary policy, fiscal policy in 
Uganda remained largely conservative during the 
crisis period, with no expressed policy to increase the 
size of the fiscal deficit.  
Because of the crisis, the expectation was 
that funding to social sectors could suffer 
as revenues declined. Contrary to this 
expectation, tax revenue performance 
continued to do well, remaining broadly 
within targets.  
Spending on social sectors was accordingly 
not reduced on account of poor revenue 
performance as had been anticipated. 
Before the crisis, government had plans to 
address horizontal inequality through the 
Peace and Reconciliation Development 
Programme and the Northern Uganda Social 
Action Fund II. Most importantly, 
implementation of these programmes has 
gone ahead as planned; any delays in 
implementation cannot be attributed to 
shortfalls in revenue. The implementation 
has been facilitated with relative peace in 
this part of the country since 2008. 
During 2009/10, Uganda adopted further revenue 
and expenditure measures that were geared 
towards reducing the cost of doing business and 
encouraging private sector investment in priority 
sectors. 
One notable expenditure measure geared to 
reducing the cost of doing business was a 
significant increase in the budget for public sector 
infrastructure, mainly for power generation and 
construction of roads.  
 
Others include encouraging investment in 
agriculture for production through instituting a 
credit guarantee scheme. Government put in the 
budget a Ush30 billion guarantee to banks that 
would lend for agricultural production. 
Tax refunds to registered businesses that invest in 
construction of hotels are in place, as are tax 
refunds for registered businesses that import 
education materials.  
Zambia In 2008, the government pursued a limited 
expansionary fiscal policy that would restrict the 
budget deficit to no more than 3% of GDP. The 
expansionary stimuli were targeted at government 
spending on infrastructure, health and education. 
Government also increased its borrowing to 3% of 
GDP from the planned 1.9% in 2009. It has continued 
to pursue a prudent and tight monetary policy with the 
aim of reducing the inflation rate to below 10% and 
maintaining overall macroeconomic stability.  
The government stuck to its flexible market-
determined exchange rate policy in 2009.  
However, the Bank of Zambia has from time to time 
intervened in the market to smooth fluctuations in the 
exchange rate to maintain stability but also as a result 
of public pressure. 
Government policy on poverty reduction 
during the crisis seems to consist mainly in 
the protection of key social expenditures in 
education and health.  
Interviews with directors of some non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) 
revealed that they have taken a cautious 
approach to the expansion of their activities 
as they were not guaranteed increased 
funding. Others observed that some of their 
funders have decided to scale down their 
activities and in some cases cannot renew 
their partnerships with local NGOs on 
account of funding uncertainties.  
Government facilitated the reopening of some 
mines that were closed by undertaking to liquidate 
debts left by former mine owners.  
There were no growth-enhancing structural and 
institutional reforms. There is no evidence of any 
drive to diversify the economy.  
There has been no effort to introduce governance 
reforms in the mining sector. 
  
To improve the fiscal mining regime, the government 
removed the windfall tax in early 2009 as a response 
to the crisis, but this reduced revenues. 
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